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HOW THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE CAN 
INFLUENCE SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS:  
ADULTERY BANS AFTER LAWRENCE 
Andrew D. Cohen* 
 
Criminal adultery bans, despite widespread transgression and lax 
enforcement, remain on the books in a substantial minority of states.  The 
landmark Lawrence v. Texas decision casts doubt on all state interference 
with consensual sexual activity among adults, including adultery bans.  
Additionally, adultery bans on their face implicate the Establishment 
Clause, due to adultery bans’ and marriage’s roots in religious doctrine 
and religiosity.  This Note examines the constitutionality of adultery bans 
after Lawrence v. Texas, and proposes a novel approach to substantive due 
process analysis that applies Establishment Clause values.  In proposing 
what this Note dubs the “Establishment Clause prism,” through which a 
facially legitimate state interest is delegitimized if substantially motivated 
by religious forces, this Note concludes that adultery bans are 
unconstitutional. 
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INTRODUCTION 
“Adultery is nothing new.”1  From dramatic works to television talk 
shows, marital infidelity is a hot topic that, in this increasingly liberal 
society, no longer repulses audiences, but rather engenders a voyeuristic 
gravity.2  Stories of marital infidelity in television, film, and the tabloids are 
as commonplace as ever.3  Niche Internet dating services now cater to 
extra-marital affairs.4  Indeed, the adultery of our government leaders often 
headlines the papers and the television news.5  Yet, perhaps ironically, it is 
our elected leaders who, in a substantial minority of states, criminally 
proscribe adultery.6  Though adultery laws are rarely enforced,7 they 
nevertheless remain on the books as an omnipresent specter.8 
 
 1. Brenda Cossman, The New Politics of Adultery, 15 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 274, 274 
(2006). 
 2. See id. at 281–84 (discussing, inter alia, the film Fatal Attraction, the book The 
Scarlet Letter, and The Oprah Winfrey Show as some of the many examples of popularized 
infidelity). 
 3. See, e.g., id. at 295 (discussing the Brad Pitt, Jennifer Aniston, and Angelina Jolie 
love triangle); Mad Men (AMC television series 2007–present) (centering on dapper Don 
Draper, the 1960s adulterous advertising executive whose extra-marital affairs are as 
important to him as his family and career); This American Life:  Infidelity, Chicago Public 
Radio (Nov. 1, 2009) (downloaded using iTunes), available at 
http://www.thisamericanlife.org/radio-archives/episode/393/infidelity (interviewing blogger 
Jessica Pressler and discussing her recognition of a growing number of New York Times 
wedding and engagement announcements that highlight the adulterous origins of the 
couples’ current nuptials). 
 4. See THE ASHLEY MADISON AGENCY, http://www.ashleymadison.com/ (last visited 
Oct. 23, 2010) (whose trademarked slogan is “Life is Short.  Have an Affair.”). 
 5. See, e.g., Robbie Brown & Sheila Dewan, Ending Mystery, a Governor Says He Had 
an Affair, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2009, at A1 (describing South Carolina Governor Mark 
Sanford’s adulterous tryst in Argentina and admission of infidelity); David Kocieniewski & 
Danny Hakim, Spitzer Resigns:  Felled by Sex Scandal, He Says His Focus Is on Family, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2008, at A1 (reporting New York Governor Eliot Spitzer’s resignation 
after being caught planning to meet a prostitute); see also ANNETTE GORDON-REED, THOMAS 
JEFFERSON AND SALLY HEMINGS:  AN AMERICAN CONTROVERSY 186–87 (1997) (suggesting 
that even one of our Founding Fathers committed adultery). 
 6. See infra notes 50–56 and accompanying text. 
 7. See, e.g., State v. Holm, 137 P.3d 726, 772 n.22 (Utah 2006) (“The most recent 
adultery prosecution to have reached this court appears to have occurred in 1928, under a 
previous criminal provision.” (citing State v. Lewellyn, 266 P. 261, 262 (Utah 1928))); Terri 
L. Mascherin et al., Reforming the Illinois Criminal Code:  Where the CLEAR Commission 
Stopped Short of Its Goals, 41 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 741, 746–47 (2008) (noting no 
prosecution for adultery in Illinois for over forty years, and quoting a prosecutor indicating 
that there are no plans to start enforcing the adultery statute); see also infra note 140 and 
accompanying text. 
 8. Indeed, just this past June, a married New York woman was charged with adultery 
(as well as public lewdness) after the police found her having sex on a picnic table in a park. 
See Denise Jewell Gee, A Rare Charge of Adultery Filed in Park Arrests, BUFFALO NEWS, 
June 8, 2010, at B1.  Although she first threatened a constitutional challenge to the adultery 
ban, see Eamon McNiff, Woman Charged with Adultery To Challenge New York Law, 
ABCNEWS.COM (June 8, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/TheLaw/woman-charged-adultery-
challenge-york-law/story?id=10857437, the District Attorney dropped the charge when the 
woman pled guilty to lewdness. See Matt Gryta, Batavia Adultery Suspect Pleads Guilty to 
Lewdness, BUFFALO NEWS, Aug. 12, 2010, at B1. 
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This Note examines the constitutionality of criminal adultery laws in the 
context of both substantive due process privacy rights and Establishment 
Clause values.  This Note compares the arguments made by scholars and 
courts for and against governmental regulation of adultery, under both 
rubrics.  Finally, this Note argues that, even if criminal adultery laws may 
withstand challenges under either a substantive due process or an 
Establishment Clause challenge alone, they are nevertheless 
unconstitutional.  In reaching this conclusion, this Note proposes a new 
approach to substantive due process influenced by Establishment Clause 
values.  Specifically, this Note proposes an “Establishment Clause prism,” 
that refracts and delegitimizes the state’s interest within the traditional 
substantive due process calculus, reasoning that the state’s interest in 
passing laws that infringe important liberties—for example, sexual 
privacy—is less legitimate where such laws are motivated by substantial 
religious forces. 
Part I of this Note describes both the institution of marriage and the 
history of adultery laws, as well as the relevant constitutional principles and 
doctrines.  Part II explores the constitutionality of criminal adultery laws 
under each of the relevant areas of constitutional law.  Finally, Part III 
proposes the Establishment Clause prism, applies the prism to criminal 
adultery laws, and shows that applying the prism to some of the Court’s 
substantive due process decisions leads to the same results. 
I.  MARRIAGE, ADULTERY, SEXUAL PRIVACY, AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY:  A 
FACTUAL AND LEGAL BACKGROUND 
The crime of adultery generally requires (1) sexual intercourse (2) with 
the spouse of another.9  An analysis of adultery laws thus necessitates 
examination of both the institution of marriage (a necessary condition to the 
commission of adultery) and whether and how the state can regulate human 
sexuality (i.e., the right to sexual privacy).10  This part lays the foundation 
for the analysis to come, providing a brief background of marriage itself 
and the history of adultery laws, and a synopsis of the relevant fields of 
constitutional jurisprudence. 
Part I.A discusses the institution of marriage (i.e., the “but for” condition 
of an adultery offense) to provide an understanding of marriage as both a 
religious and a legal institution, which will be necessary to understand the 
purported state justifications for criminalizing adultery, and to appreciate 
the religious underpinnings of the institution.  Part I.B describes the 
 
 9. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER & KATHARINE B. SILBAUGH, A GUIDE TO 
AMERICA’S SEX LAWS 103–10 (1996) (collecting both criminal and civil adultery statutes). 
 10. Sex outside of marriage is “fornication,” an offense that, in contrast to adultery, has 
been decriminalized in the vast majority of states. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 725 (9th 
ed. 2009); Sylvia A. Law, Commercial Sex:  Beyond Decriminalization, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 
523, 526 n.8 (2000) (collecting sources).  While fornication and adultery bans both 
criminalize coitus, fornication requires that neither party is married, while adultery requires 
that one or both are.  As such, there is substantial overlap in the constitutional analysis of 
laws criminalizing fornication.  Nevertheless, this Note focuses exclusively on adultery. 
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evolution of laws criminalizing adultery, from Biblical to modern times, in 
an effort to similarly expound the state justifications (i.e., legislative 
purpose) for its criminalization, as well as to understand the role religion 
and its tenets have played in adultery’s status as both sin and crime. 
Part I.C discusses the relevant constitutional principles arising under the 
doctrine of substantive due process, namely the evolution of the right to 
privacy.  This part culminates in a discussion of the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
landmark sexual privacy decision, Lawrence v. Texas.11  Part I.D discusses 
the Court’s related intimate association jurisprudence, which sets forth a 
standard under which adulterous relationships have been analyzed.  Finally, 
Part I.E summarizes a portion of the Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause 
cases, with a focus on the standards by which the Court has invalidated 
laws enacted with religious motivations. 
A.  The Institution of Marriage 
Marriage is ubiquitous.12  As Justice William O. Douglas famously 
noted, “[m]arriage is a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully 
enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred.”13  This section 
discusses the legal institution of marriage, as evolved from its religious 
roots, and as recognized (or not) by law today.  This section provides an 
understanding of the inseparably religious origins of marriage and its 
importance in the eyes of the state. 
1.  The Religious Foundations of the Legal Institution of Marriage 
One might argue that marriage (or at least monogamy) exists in nature, 
and is thus of biological or natural origin.14  Throughout the history of 
Western civilization, marriage was a central aspect of the family unit, from 
the ancient Greeks and Romans, to the biblical Israelites.15  For the ancient 
Romans, marriage was primarily a personal contract, divorced, as it were, 
 
 11. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 12. According to 2004 census data, 68.8% of men and 74.2% of women over the age of 
fifteen had been married. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, MARITAL HISTORY FOR PEOPLE 15 
YEARS AND OVER, BY AGE AND SEX:  2004, http://www.census.gov/
population/socdemo/marital-hist/2004/Table3.2004.xls. 
 13. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (emphasis added). 
 14. See Elizabeth F. Emens, Monogamy’s Law:  Compulsory Monogamy and 
Polyamorous Existence, 29 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 277, 294 & n.77 (2004) 
(collecting sources containing “explanations for why humans may pair up in order to 
promote the survival of their individual gene pools”); cf. PARTNERSHIPS IN BIRDS:  THE 
STUDY OF MONOGAMY (Jeffrey M. Black ed., 1996) (describing the natural monogamy of 
some species of birds). But see Emens, supra, at 294–96 (criticizing these theories of natural 
monogamy as merely the “stories we tell”). 
 15. See generally MARRIAGE AND FAMILY IN THE BIBLICAL WORLD (Ken M. Campbell 
ed., 2003) (presenting accounts of marriage and family in the ancient Near East, ancient 
Israel, ancient Greek society, Roman society, Second Temple Judaism, and the New 
Testament). 
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from both religion and government.16  Marriage was predominantly 
sociological—“an institution for protecting the assets and interests of the 
elites”—and generally lacked a transcendent purpose.17 
With the advent and rise of Christianity, religious thought began to shape 
the institution of marriage.18  Thus, not only did marriage remain a natural 
and a contractual relationship, but it also evolved into a distinctly religious 
endeavor, a sacrament.19  As such, marriage and its mandates—for 
example, marital fidelity—were enforced not by the courts of the state, but 
by courts of the Catholic Church.20  Although marriage as sacrament later 
was abandoned in the Anglo tradition during the English Reformation,21 the 
“divine origin of marriage” nevertheless remained central to legal thought, 
as evidenced by the “English ecclesiastical courts retain[ing] jurisdiction 
over marriage and its incidents” until 1857.22 
According to Christian philosophy, exemplified in the writings of 
Augustine, the purpose of marriage was threefold:  procreation, fidelity, and 
permanence.23  These formulations of marital purpose endured into the 
early American common law.24  Courts of the day used language 
referencing the divine origin of marriage—particularly the paramount 
divine purpose of procreation—in their judicial opinions.25 American courts 
persisted in invoking the religious origins of marriage well into the 
twentieth century to support their legal reasoning—at times even resorting 
to the citation of scripture.26 
Today, although a significant percentage of Americans view marriage as 
a legal matter left for the courts, a majority of Americans nevertheless sees 
 
 16. See ERWIN J. HAEBERLE, THE SEX ATLAS:  A NEW ILLUSTRATED GUIDE 408–09 
(1978). See generally SUSAN TREGGIARI, ROMAN MARRIAGE:  IUSTI CONIUGES FROM THE 
TIME OF CICERO TO THE TIME OF ULPIAN (1991). 
 17. See Charles J. Reid, Jr., The Augustinian Goods of Marriage:  The Disappearing 
Cornerstone of the American Law of Marriage, 18 BYU J. PUB. L. 449, 451 (2004).  Thus, 
ancients developed the “bride-price” concept, whereby a suitor provided a “bride-wealth” in 
exchange for his bride-to-be’s consent. See Jeremy D. Weinstein, Note, Adultery, Law, and 
the State:  A History, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 195, 203–04 (1986).  This does not imply that brides 
were treated as property—rather, the importance and value of marriage was reflected in its 
relation to property. Id. at 203–04 & n.49. 
 18. See Charles J. Reid, Jr., Marriage:  Its Relationship to Religion, Law, and the State, 
in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY:  EMERGING CONFLICTS 157, 159 (Douglas 
Laycock et al. eds., 2008). 
 19. See JOHN WITTE, JR., FROM SACRAMENT TO CONTRACT:  MARRIAGE, RELIGION, AND 
LAW IN THE WESTERN TRADITION 22–23, 26–30 (1997). 
 20. See id. at 30–32; see also Weinstein, supra note 17, at 214. 
 21. See Reid, supra note 18, at 160 (citing WITTE, supra note 19, at 140–53). 
 22. Id. at 161. 
 23. See id. at 159 (citing AUGUSTINE, DE BONO CONIUGALI, DE SANCTA VIRGINITATE 
(P.G. Walsh ed., 2001)); Reid, supra note 17, at 452–53; see also WITTE, supra note 19, at 
21–22. 
 24. See Reid, supra note 17, at 462–70 (describing implicit references to the three 
Augustinian “goods” in nineteenth century judicial decisions and commentaries). 
 25. See Reid, supra note 18, at 164–65. 
 26. See, e.g., id. at 166 (“‘[M]arriage is a divine institution.’” (quoting Pryor v. Pryor, 
235 S.W. 419, 420–21 (Ark. 1921))); id. at 172–73 (quoting Maricopa Cnty. v. Douglas, 208 
P.2d 646, 651 (Ariz. 1949) (quoting Genesis 2:24)). 
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marriage as principally a religious affair.27  Our government and laws 
reflect this belief—indeed, all states recognize civil marriages officiated by 
members of the clergy.28  The legislative history of the Defense of Marriage 
Act29—defining marriage as between one man and one woman and 
providing that states need not recognize any other form of marriage—also 
appears to ground itself in the religious foundations of marriage.30  Even the 
Supreme Court, some argue, has relied on the religious dimension of 
marriage in its line of cases upholding a fundamental right to marry.31 
The legal institution of marriage in America is thus an institution that, 
although secular in form, derives from unavoidably religious origins and 
retains ineluctably religious value.32 
2.  The Secular Importance of Marriage:  Legal Recognition and 
Ramifications 
The state has long retained sovereignty over marriage and, despite some 
constitutional limits, possesses the power to regulate and control entrance 
into it, and exit from it.33  The legal recognition of marriage serves many 
purposes.  The Supreme Court, in a decision regarding marital rights for 
prison inmates, identified several “important attributes of marriage”:  
marriage as “expression[] of emotional support and public commitment,” 
marriage as an institution of “spiritual significance,” and marriage as a 
“precondition to the receipt of governmental benefits.”34  Thus, the Court 
has recognized that there is both a religious and a secular dimension to 
 
 27. See Douglas Laycock, Afterword, in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY:  
EMERGING CONFLICTS, supra note 18, at 189, 205 (citing a 2003 poll indicating that fifty-
three percent of Americans hold this view compared to thirty-three percent who view 
marriage as legal in nature). 
 28. See Perry Dane, A Holy Secular Institution, 58 EMORY L.J. 1123, 1137 (2009). 
 29. Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7, 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1738C (2006)). 
 30. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-664, at 15 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905, 
2919 (“For many Americans, there is to this issue of marriage an overtly moral or religious 
aspect that cannot be divorced from the practicalities.”); id. (“[T]he fact that there are 
distinct religious and civil components of marriage does not mean that the two do not 
intersect.”). 
 31. See Dane, supra note 28, at 1151–52 (referencing Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 
(1967) and Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978)); see also infra note 91. 
 32. The debate over the religious or secular character of marriage rages on, particularly 
in the context of same-sex marriage. Compare Dane, supra note 28, at 1129, 1159–72 
(arguing that marriage is not a “wholly secular institution,” and instead has irreducibly 
religious elements), with Laycock, supra note 27, at 201–07 (arguing for a clear separation 
of legal from religious marriage).  In the recent battle over California’s constitutional 
amendment banning same-sex marriage, the proponents advanced only secular justifications, 
according to the court, because the proponents “[p]erhaps recogniz[ed] that Proposition 8 
must advance a secular purpose to be constitution.” See Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. 
Supp. 2d 921, 931 (N.D. Cal. 2010).  
 33. See Loving, 388 U.S. at 7 (“[M]arriage is a social relation subject to the State’s 
police power.” (citing Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190 (1888))); see also Commonwealth v. 
Stowell, 449 N.E.2d 357, 360 (Mass. 1983). 
 34. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95–96 (1987). 
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marriage, the latter located in part in the grant of certain benefits to married 
couples and not to others.35 
The governmental benefits of marriage are many and varied, including 
Social Security and tax advantages, health benefits for government 
employees, and hospital visitation rights.36  Indeed, Massachusetts alone 
has “‘hundreds of statutes’ . . . related to marriage and marital benefits.”37  
These legal advantages of marriage remain central concerns in the recent 
and persistent national debate over same-sex marriage.38 
B.  The Criminalization of Adultery 
Having described the legal origin and benefits of marriage, a condition 
necessary to be charged with the crime of adultery, this Note continues by 
outlining the history of the criminalization of adultery.  As one of the 
criminal laws’ means of protecting the institution of marriage, the history of 
marriage and the history of adultery’s proscription—not surprisingly—run 
largely parallel.  The road to the current status of adultery laws provides an 
understanding of the states’ interests in preserving the criminal ban. 
1.  A Brief History of the Crime of Adultery39 
As long as there has been monogamous marriage, there has been both the 
act of, and retribution for, infidelity.40  All ancient cultures, from the Far 
Easterners to the Greco-Romans to the Eastern Europeans, punished 
adultery in one form or another.41  One of the earliest and most well-known 
ancient adultery bans is present in the Ten Commandments:  “You shall not 
commit adultery.”42  As Christianity spread, “adultery became a sin as well 
as a wrong against the husband.”43  As such, criminal prosecutions for 
 
 35. See id. 
 36. See generally Donald J. Cantor, The Practical Benefits of Marriage, in SAME-SEX 
MARRIAGE:  THE LEGAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL EVOLUTION IN AMERICA 135 (Donald J. Cantor 
et al. eds., 2006) (compiling governmental benefits of marriage). 
 37. See Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 955–56 (Mass. 2003) 
(collecting statutes). 
 38. See, e.g., Monica Davey, Gay Couples in Iowa Win Right To Wed, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 
4, 2009, at A1 (reporting the invalidation of an Iowa law limiting marriage to heterosexual 
unions); Abby Goodnough, Gay Rights Rebuke May Result in a Change in Tactics, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 5, 2009, at A25 (describing Maine voters’ referendum blocking same-sex 
marriage). See generally SAME-SEX MARRIAGE:  THE LEGAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL 
EVOLUTION IN AMERICA, supra note 36. 
 39. For a detailed history of ancient adultery laws, see Daniel E. Murray, Ancient Laws 
on Adultery—A Synopsis, 1 J. FAM. L. 89 (1961). 
 40. See id. at 89 (“The history of man indicates that as soon as he created the 
relationship of marriage, ‘adultery was not far behind.’”). 
 41. See id. at 91–103.  For a collection of adultery prosecutions and sentences in ancient 
Roman times, see TREGGIARI, supra note 16, at 509–10. 
 42. Deuteronomy 5:18 (King James); Exodus 20:14 (King James). 
 43. Weinstein, supra note 17, at 207. 
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adultery were not favored in the common law of England, and enforcement 
was left to the courts of the church.44 
Although America inherited much of England’s common law, several 
early American colonies—with their Puritanical bent—broke from the 
English legal tradition and made adultery a capital offense, deriving 
authority for this punishment from religion.45  Other punishments for 
adultery in the colonies included eighty lashes and the now-infamous 
“scarlet letter.”46  Adultery during this time “was seen almost entirely as an 
offense against morality and chastity,” with almost no secular 
justification.47  Despite rare enforcement of the laws, adultery remained a 
criminal offense through the time of the founding, and well into the 
twentieth century.48 
2.  Adultery Bans in the Present Day 
a.  State Survey 
Adultery is recognized by most states as grounds for divorce,49 but is a 
crime in only twenty-three states.50  Adultery is a misdemeanor in a 
majority of these states,51 but is punished as a felony in some.52  
 
 44. See Martin J. Siegel, For Better or for Worse:  Adultery, Crime & the Constitution, 
30 J. FAM. L. 45, 47–48 (1991); cf. supra note 22 and accompanying text (English 
ecclesiastic courts have jurisdiction over marriage). 
 45. See Meghan E.B. Norton, The Adulterous Wife:  A Cross-Historical and 
Interdisciplinary Approach, 16 BUFF. WOMEN’S L.J. 1, 3–4 (2008) (“The church was also a 
source for the law’s power to condemn someone to death for committing adultery . . . .” 
(citing MARY BETH NORTON, FOUNDING MOTHERS & FATHERS:  GENDERED POWER AND THE 
FORMING OF AMERICAN SOCIETY 325 (1996))); see also Siegel, supra note 44, at 48. 
 46. See Siegel, supra note 44, at 48 (referencing Nathaniel Hawthorne’s well-known 
novel, The Scarlet Letter); Jonathan Turley, Of Lust and the Law, WASH. POST, Sept. 5, 
2004, at B1. 
 47. Weinstein, supra note 17, at 225–26. 
 48. See Siegel, supra note 44, at 49; Melanie C. Falco, Note, The Road Not Taken:  
Using the Eighth Amendment To Strike Down Criminal Punishment for Engaging in 
Consensual Sexual Acts, 82 N.C. L. REV. 723, 744 & nn.171–74 (2004). 
 49. See generally POSNER & SILBAUGH, supra note 9, at 103–10. 
 50. See ALA. CODE § 13A-13-2 (LexisNexis 2005); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1408 
(2010); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-6-501 (2009); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 798.01 (West 2007); GA. 
CODE ANN. § 16-6-19 (2007); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-6601 (2004); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
ANN. 5/11-7 (West 2010); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3507 (2007); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW 
§ 10-501 (LexisNexis 2009); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 272, § 14 (LexisNexis 2010); MICH. 
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.30 (West 2004); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.36 (West 2009); MISS. 
CODE ANN. § 97-29-1 (West 2009); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 645:3 (LexisNexis 2007); N.Y. 
PENAL LAW § 255.17 (McKinney 2010); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-184 (2009); N.D. CENT. 
CODE § 12.1-20-09 (1997); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 871 (West 2002); R.I. GEN. LAWS 
§ 11-6-2 (2002); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-15-60 (2009); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-103 
(LexisNexis 2008); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-365 (2009); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 944.16 (West 
2005). 
 51. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1408; 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-7; N.H. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 645:3. 
 52. See, e.g., MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 272, § 14, ch. 274, § 1; MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. 
§ 750.30. 
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Punishments range from nominal fines53 to jail time.54  The definitions of 
an adultery offense, as well as the conditions for initiating prosecution, vary 
from state to state, but all ban in some form this particular brand of adult 
consensual sexual activity.55  Nevertheless, adultery proscriptions are rarely 
if ever enforced.56 
While some of the current adultery bans were originally enacted in the 
nineteenth century,57 others were enacted or re-enacted much more 
recently.58  Some laws were on the books until only recently.59  Others have 
 
 53. See MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 10-501 (fine of ten dollars). 
 54. See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-6601 (up to one year in county jail or up to three years in 
state penitentiary); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 255.17 (listing adultery as a “class B misdemeanor,” 
which can lead to a sentence of up to three months, see N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.15(2)). 
 55. For example, some states require the conduct to be “open and notorious,” while 
others criminalize the adulterous act per se. Compare 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-7 
(requiring adulterous behavior to be “open and notorious”), with R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-6-2 
(having no requirements other than sexual intercourse with a married person).  Several states 
do not allow for prosecution unless initiated by the complaint of the offended spouse. See 
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1408(B); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.36(2); N.D. CENT. CODE 
§ 12.1-20-09(2).  Minnesota limits adultery to sexual intercourse with a married woman; 
intercourse with a married man does not constitute adultery. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.36. 
 56. Compare with the military, in which criminal prosecution of adultery under Article 
134 (the “General Article”) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice is not uncommon, and 
incarceration is a very real possibility. See, e.g., United States v. Moore, ACM 37286, 2009 
WL 1508506 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. May 21, 2009) (upholding the lower court’s sentence to 
discharge for, inter alia, an adultery conviction); United States v. Orellana, 62 M.J. 595 (N-
M. Ct. Crim. App. 2005) (affirming the lower court’s conviction and confinement sentence), 
review denied, 63 M.J. 295 (C.A.A.F. 2006). See generally Walter T. Cox, III, Consensual 
Sex Crimes in the Armed Forces:  A Primer for the Uninformed, 14 DUKE J. GENDER L. 
& POL’Y 791, 795–99 (2007).  Conviction for adultery in the military, however, requires 
conduct that was “to the prejudice of good order and discipline in the armed forces or was of 
a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces.” MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED 
STATES, pt. 4, ¶ 62 (2008), available at http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/MCM-
2008.pdf.  The military-specific rational for criminalizing adultery has been explained by 
one court: 
[T]he military has a particular interest in promoting the preservation of marriages 
within its ranks.  Because military families are often required to endure extended 
separations from a spouse due to operational commitments, commanders have a 
unique responsibility to ensure that the morale of their deployed personnel (and 
that of the spouses left behind) is not adversely affected by concerns over the 
integrity of their marriages. 
Orellana, 62 M.J. at 601. 
  One scholar has argued that military proscriptions of adultery are unconstitutional 
under Lawrence v. Texas, because such criminalization serves only to enforce a moral code. 
See Christopher Scott Maravilla, The Other Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell:  Adultery Under the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice After Lawrence v. Texas, 37 CAP. U. L. REV. 659, 661 
(2009). But cf. infra text accompanying notes 271–74. 
 57. See POSNER & SILBAUGH, supra note 9, at 107, 109 (Mississippi in 1848, Rhode 
Island in 1896). 
 58. See, e.g., 1977 Ala. Acts 812, 909; 2002 Md. Laws 197, 732; see also infra notes 
66–75 and accompanying text (detailing the 1965 enactment of New York’s current adultery 
law). 
 59. See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-8-3 (LexisNexis 2009) (repealed 2010); see also 50 
D.C. Reg. 10996 (Dec. 26, 2003) (repealing section 22-201 of the D.C. Code). 
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survived recent repeal attempts.60  The commentary accompanying section 
13A-13-2 of the Alabama Code provides a likely rationale as to why many 
adultery laws have not been repealed to this day:  “While there is strong 
sentiment that adultery should not be regulated by criminal sanction, . . . the 
political success of a proposal formally to abolish this crime would, at the 
present time, be doubtful.”61 
b.  The Legislative History of New York’s Current Adultery Ban 
The justifications for and the legislative history of adultery laws are 
critical components of a constitutional analysis of adultery, within either a 
substantive due process rubric (where a statute must be either rationally 
related to a legitimate state purpose or narrowly tailored to serve a 
compelling state interest)62 or an Establishment Clause framework (where 
the actual legislative purpose must not be religious).63  This section 
examines a case in point:  the enactment of New York’s current adultery 
ban.64 
While New York has long criminalized adultery,65 New York’s present-
day ban was enacted in 1965.66  In the early 1960s, New York convened a 
Temporary Commission on Revision of the Penal Law and Criminal Code 
charged with studying and proposing revisions to its criminal code, which 
had not been fully updated since 1881.67  The Commission presented its 
entire proposal to the state legislature.68  The proposal purposely excluded 
an adultery ban (as well as a sodomy ban), stating that adultery “is a matter 
of private morality, not of law.”69 
 
 60. See, e.g., Alberta I. Cook, Adultery Statute Survives Debate in New Hampshire, 
NAT’L L.J., Apr. 20, 1987, at 14; Turley, supra note 46 (“Virginia, which is seeking to repeal 
its anti-fornication and anti-sodomy statutes, decided to keep adultery a crime.”). 
 61. ALA. CODE § 13A-13-2 (LexisNexis 2005) (emphasis added) (commentary 
accompanying statute).  The commentary further states that “formal repudiation of the 
adultery offense was premature,” and that “it may prove useful on occasions, as for example 
in plea bargaining.” Id. 
 62. See infra notes 80–85 and accompanying text. 
 63. See infra Part I.E. 
 64. Section 255.17 of New York’s Penal Law specifically provides that “[a] person is 
guilty of adultery when he engages in sexual intercourse with another person at a time when 
he has a living spouse, or the other person has a living spouse.” N.Y. PENAL LAW § 255.17 
(McKinney 2010); see supra note 54. 
 65. New York’s first adultery ban was enacted in 1907. See S.N. Tuckman, 
Unfaithfulness a Crime:  Effect of the Laws of 1907 upon Divorce Procedure, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 23, 1907, at 6. 
 66. 1965 N.Y. Laws 2683, 2683 (codified at N.Y. PENAL LAW § 255.17). 
 67. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 255.17 note (William C. Donnino, Practice Commentary); 
John Sibley, Overhaul Urged for Penal Code, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 1964, at 1. 
 68. See Sibley, supra note 67. 
 69. See id.  The Practice Commentary notes that: 
A majority of the Commission was of the opinion that the basic problem is one of 
private rather than public morals, and that its inclusion in a criminal code neither 
protects the public nor acts as a deterrent.  It was further noted that proscribing 
conduct which is almost universally overlooked by law enforcement agencies 
tends to weaken the fabric of the whole penal law. 
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Over a year after the Commission’s report was presented to the 
legislature, the New York State Assembly, with praise for the Commission 
and its chair, addressed and passed the revised code without an adultery 
ban.70  Almost immediately, however, Assemblyman Julius Volker 
introduced amendments to the penal law to reinstate the adultery and 
sodomy provisions, citing the churchmen’s fears.71  Soon thereafter, the 
Assembly “voted overwhelmingly” to retain both the adultery and the 
sodomy ban.72  The New York State Senate quickly followed suit.73 
On June 15, 1965, Assemblyman Volker sent the bill to the Governor’s 
office for approval, explaining the purpose for introducing the bill: 
 The reaction to the omission of [the adultery and sodomy] offenses 
was so great, as expressed in letters, in the statements of church people at 
the hearings before the Commission, and in newspaper stories, that the 
minority members on the Commission decided to present the question to 
the Legislature by two separate bills. . . . 
 The introducers of these bills agree with the representatives of the 
various churches that to omit these crimes from the new Penal Law would 
amount to tacit approval of immoral conduct.  The introducers believe 
that the Legislature of the State of New York is not less conscious of the 
desires of the great majority of the people to present an aspect of a society 
which believes in good morals and in observing the conventions.74 
Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller approved the Volker amendments soon 
thereafter as a package with the entire penal code revision without 
addressing their merits.  According to the Governor, “[i]t was evident that 
the main bills would not have passed the Legislature without . . . assurance” 
that the amendments would be part of the package.75 
 
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 255.17 note (William C. Donnino, Practice Commentary). 
 70. See John Sibley, Assembly Passes a Total Revision of the Penal Law, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 4, 1965, at 1. 
 71. See id. (“Mr. Volker said his bills were ‘inspired by the entreaties of churchmen who 
fear we would be appearing to give passive approval to deviant sexual practices.’”); see also 
Emanuel Perlmutter, Catholics and Episcopalians Differ on Law for Sex Deviates, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 26, 1964, at 1 (reporting on the Commission’s public hearings and noting the 
Catholic spokesmen’s entreaty to reinstate the adultery provision, stating that “adultery is a 
serious threat to the marriage bond, undermines family life and endangers the common 
good”). 
 72. John Sibley, Assembly Keeps Ban on Adultery, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 1965, at 1.  
Assemblyman Richard J. Bartlett, the chair of the Temporary Commission, opined that the 
Legislature acted to restore the adultery ban “upon the theory that elimination of this crime 
might be publicly construed as legislative approval of adultery.” See Memorandum of 
Assemblyman Richard J. Bartlett on Penal Law Revision, reprinted in 1965 N.Y. ST. LEGIS. 
ANN.51. 
 73. John Sibley, Senate Accepts Ban on Adultery, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 1965, at 43. 
 74. Letter from Julius Volker, Assemblyman, N.Y. State Assembly, to Sol Neil Corbin, 
Counsel to Governor Nelson Rockefeller (June 15, 1965), microformed on Bill Jacket, A.I. 
4972, Pr. 5147, Ch. 1037, at C2 (accompanying bill sent to the governor for approval). 
 75. Memorandum of Governor Rockefeller on Approval, reprinted in 1965 N.Y. ST. 
LEGIS. ANN. 530, 531. 
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To summarize, New York enacted its current adultery ban over 
recommendations to the contrary, not for facially secular reasons (i.e., to 
prevent harm to innocent parties, to limit the spread of disease, or to protect 
the institution of marriage),76 but—at least according to the bill’s sponsor 
(and prompted by community outrage from the church)—to avoid the “tacit 
approval of immoral conduct.”77  This Note revisits New York’s enactment 
in Parts II and III. 
C.  Substantive Due Process and the Right to Privacy 
The Court has developed the doctrine of substantive due process over the 
years as it struggled to balance an individual’s freedom against the needs of 
government.  A contradiction in terms, “substantive due process” refers to 
the Court’s application of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to invalidate certain state action and to the analysis the Court 
uses in so doing.  Indeed, substantive due process is the mechanism by 
which the Court has protected a certain scope of liberty from encroachment 
by government action.78  This section provides a brief background of the 
Court’s substantive due process doctrine, and summarizes its landmark 
ruling in Lawrence v. Texas,79 the case that challenges the footing upon 
which the validity of adultery laws rests. 
1.  The Doctrinal Formulation 
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that no 
state shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law.”80  Modern substantive due process doctrine has developed 
into a two-step inquiry.  First, a court inquires whether a “fundamental 
right” is at stake.81  If so, then a “strict scrutiny” standard of review 
applies—there must be a “compelling state interest” and the state action 
must be “narrowly tailored” to serve that state interest.82  If there is no 
fundamental right at stake, then the “rational basis” standard is applied—the 
statute must be only “rationally related” to a merely legitimate state 
interest.83 
To determine whether a fundamental right is at stake, as opposed to some 
other mere “liberty interest,” the Court generally applies a formulation that 
finds root in Justice Benjamin N. Cardozo’s opinion for the Court in Palko 
 
 76. Cf. infra Part II.A.2.a (noting that these goals are often cited as arguably legitimate 
state interests advanced by adultery bans). 
 77. See Letter from Julius Volker, supra note 74; text accompanying supra note 74. 
 78. See infra Part I.C.1. 
 79. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 80. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 81. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720–21 (1997). 
 82. See id. at 721 (citing Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993)); see also Roe v. 
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155–56 (1973). 
 83. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 728 (citing Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319–20 (1993); 
Flores, 507 U.S. at 305). 
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v. Connecticut.84  Specifically, the Court finds a fundamental right where it 
is “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty”—that is, a right “so rooted in 
the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as 
fundamental.”85 
The Court recognized early in the twentieth century the fundamental 
importance of the intimate family in upholding the right to direct the 
upbringing of one’s children.86  The Court also foreshadowed the 
heightened importance of the institution of marriage and its procreative 
purposes.87  The Court, however, entered the modern “right to privacy” age 
of substantive due process with its 1965 contraception decision in Griswold 
v. Connecticut.88 
In Griswold, the Court invalidated a statute banning the sale of 
contraceptives to married couples.89  In a terse opinion, Justice Douglas, 
writing for the Court, identified a right of personal privacy within the 
“penumbras” and “emanations” of the specific guarantees of the Bill of 
Rights.90  Relying on the special character of the institution of marriage—a 
“way of life,” a “harmony in living,” a “loyalty,” a “noble” purpose—the 
Court struck the Connecticut statute.91  Several years later, the Court, in an 
Equal Protection decision invalidating a Massachusetts statute banning the 
distribution of contraceptives, unhooked Griswold’s analysis from the 
institution of marriage.92  In Eisenstadt v. Baird, the Court emphasized that 
a marriage is a union of two individuals, and that “it is the right of the 
 
 84. 302 U.S. 319 (1937). 
 85. Id. at 325.  This formulation has been widely cited. See, e.g., Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 
at 721; Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 951 (1992) (Rehnquist, C.J., 
concurring in the judgment in part, dissenting in part); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 
191–92 (1986); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 
479, 500 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment).  “Careful description” of the 
asserted right is also required. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721 (citing Flores, 507 U.S. at 
302; Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992); Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of 
Health, 497 U.S. 261, 277–78 (1990)). 
 86. See Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 
390 (1923). 
 87. See Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (“Marriage 
and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race.”); cf. supra 
notes 23–26 and accompanying text (discussing the Augustinian marital “good” of 
procreation and its permeation into the American common law). 
 88. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 89. Id. at 486. 
 90. Id. at 484. 
 91. Id. at 486; cf. id. at 495 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (“[T]he rights to marital privacy 
and to marry and raise a family are of similar order and magnitude as the fundamental rights 
specifically protected.”).  The Court has viewed the choice to enter into, and exit from, 
marriage as fundamentally important. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) 
(invalidating an anti-miscegenation statute under the Due Process Clause by recognizing an 
unqualified freedom to marry which “cannot be infringed by the State”); see also Zablocki v. 
Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978) (“[T]he right to marry is of fundamental importance for 
all individuals.”); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 374 (1971) (relying on “the basic 
position of the marriage relationship in this society’s hierarchy of values” in prohibiting 
states from burdening one’s access to the courts in seeking a divorce). 
 92. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
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individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental 
intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision 
whether to bear or beget a child.”93  The Court later affirmed Eisenstadt’s 
dicta regarding Griswold in expressly holding that Griswold protects not a 
married couple’s, but rather an individual’s freedom to choose 
contraception.94 
Whether to bear a child is the critical decision a would-be mother makes 
in contemplating an abortion, and is the critical liberty the Court addressed 
in Roe v. Wade95 and later revisited in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern 
Pennsylvania v. Casey.96  Expanding upon the protections of Griswold and 
Eisenstadt, the Court in Roe recognized that the right to choose whether to 
have an abortion is a fundamental right.97  The Court, applying strict 
scrutiny, found a compelling state interest—at least after a certain point in 
the pregnancy—in regulating this choice.98  Casey, although expanding the 
reach of this compelling state interest, nevertheless affirmed Roe’s 
fundamental rights holding.99 
2.  Lawrence v. Texas and the Right to Sexual Privacy 
The line of cases discussed in Part I.C.1 established a right to privacy in 
matters of intimate human relationships.  This right is related to (though not 
confined to) the institution of marriage—namely to marry,100 to have and 
use contraception,101 and to have an abortion.102  Lawrence v. Texas,103 
however, addressed an altogether separate intimate human relationship—
sexual intimacy. 
a.  The Lawrence v. Texas Decision 
In 2003, the Supreme Court in Lawrence v. Texas invalidated a Texas 
statute criminalizing consensual homosexual sodomy among adults.104  The 
challenge was brought by John Geddes Lawrence who, along with Tyron 
 
 93. Id. at 453 (emphasis in original). 
 94. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 687 (1977). 
 95. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 96. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 97. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 153 (“The right of privacy . . . is broad enough to encompass a 
woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.”). 
 98. See id. at 162–64.  In Roe, the compelling state interests were “preserving and 
protecting the health of the pregnant woman” and “protecting the potentiality of human life” 
(i.e., the fetus) after a certain point during the pregnancy. See id. at 162–63; cf. infra notes 
333–36 and accompanying text (noting that the legislature’s actual purpose in passing the 
anti-abortion statute of Roe was consistent with the state interest asserted during the 
litigation). 
 99. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 852–53. 
 100. See supra note 91. 
 101. See supra notes 89–94 and accompanying text. 
 102. See supra notes 95–99 and accompanying text. 
 103. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 104. Id. 
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Garner, was arrested by police who observed him engaging in anal sex.105  
The defendants were charged with violation of a statute prohibiting “deviate 
sexual intercourse with another individual of the same sex.”106  The Harris 
County Criminal Court, and the Court of Appeals of Texas, Fourteenth 
District sitting en banc, both upheld the statute against both an Equal 
Protection and Due Process challenge, relying primarily on the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Bowers v. Hardwick.107 
The Supreme Court in Lawrence began its analysis by reviewing 
Griswold, Eisenstadt, Roe, and Carey v. Population Services 
International108—the Court’s major substantive due process privacy 
decisions predating Bowers.109  The Court reconsidered the Bowers 
decision, which addressed a similar Georgia statute with a similar factual 
background.110  Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, criticized Bowers as 
“misapprehend[ing] the claim of liberty there presented to it” as a right to 
engage in homosexual sodomy.111  Instead, the Court cast the liberty at 
stake more generally, as “sexuality find[ing] overt expression in intimate 
conduct with another person.”112  Furthermore, the Court not only criticized 
Bowers’ account of history,113 but also rejected the temporal scope of the 
account, finding “our laws and traditions in the past half century [to be] of 
most relevance.”114  The Court thus identified “an emerging awareness that 
liberty gives substantial protection to adult persons in deciding how to 
conduct their private lives in matters pertaining to sex.”115  Noting that the 
Bowers holding was further eroded by Casey116 and Romer v. Evans,117 the 
Court expressly overruled Bowers.118 
 
 105. Id. at 562–63. 
 106. Id. at 563 (quoting TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06(a) (West 2003)). 
 107. Id. (citing Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), which upheld the 
constitutionality of a Georgia statute criminalizing sodomy, as being authoritative at the 
time). 
 108. 431 U.S. 678 (1977). 
 109. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564–66; cf. supra notes 89–99 and accompanying text 
(discussing Griswold, Eisentstadt, and Roe). 
 110. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 566. 
 111. Id. at 567. 
 112. See id.  The Court apparently did not cabin this intimate association to long-term or 
“meaningful” relationships, given the “seemingly casual” nature of the conduct at issue. See 
Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas:  The “Fundamental Right” That Dare Not Speak Its 
Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1904 (2004); cf. infra notes 142–50 and accompanying text 
(noting that the Court’s intimate association jurisprudence considers the extent of 
“meaningfulness” of the relationship at issue, impliedly excluding mere “casual” 
encounters).  For more on the effect of the level of generality at which an asserted right is 
analyzed on the outcome of the substantive due process analysis, see infra note 132. 
 113. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 568–71 (concluding that Bowers’ “historical premises are 
not without doubt and, at the very least, are overstated”). 
 114. Id. at 571–72. 
 115. Id. at 572. 
 116. See id. at 573–74 (citing Casey’s affirmation of “personal dignity and autonomy” in 
existential matters as central to the Fourteenth Amendment’s liberty). 
 117. See id. at 574–75 (“When homosexual conduct is made criminal . . . , that 
declaration in and of itself is an invitation to subject homosexual persons to 
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Having overruled the apposite precedent, the Court invalidated the Texas 
statute as “further[ing] no legitimate state interest which can justify its 
intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual.”119  The Court 
did, however, limit the reach of its holding, qualifying that the case “does 
not involve minors . . . persons who might be injured . . . [or] public 
conduct or prostitution.”120  Apparently departing from traditional 
substantive due process analysis, the Court neither recounted nor 
specifically addressed the state interest that Texas asserted.121 
b.  Justice Scalia’s Dissent 
The Lawrence decision was not without its strong critics—particularly 
from within the Lawrence Court itself.  Justice Scalia, imputing application 
of modern substantive due process doctrine to the majority’s opinion, 
argued in dissent that the Court applies “an unheard-of form of rational-
basis review that will have far-reaching implications beyond this case.”122  
Recounting the modern calculus used to identify whether a fundamental 
right is at stake, Justice Scalia asserted that Lawrence does not overrule 
Bowers’ core holding—that there is no fundamental right of homosexual 
sodomy—because the Court neither expressly announced a new 
fundamental right nor applied “strict scrutiny.”123 
Despite asserting that “the Court does not have the boldness” to 
announce a new fundamental right,124 Scalia nevertheless did not ignore, 
and instead rebutted, the majority’s reasoning undermining Bowers’ holding 
 
discrimination . . . .” (considering an Equal Protection argument based on Romer v. Evans, 
517 U.S. 620 (1996))). 
 118. Id. at 578 (“Bowers was not correct when it was decided, and it is not correct 
today.”). 
 119. Id. at 578.  Justice Scalia, writing in dissent, criticized this statement as reflecting an 
application of the “rational basis” standard. See id. at 594 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  Whether 
the Court applied “strict scrutiny” or “rational basis”—and by extension whether the Court 
recognized a new “fundamental right”—has been debated among courts and in the academy. 
See infra Part I.C.2.c. 
 120. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578. 
 121. The asserted state interest was “the promotion of morality.” See id. at 582 
(O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).  Whether morality simpliciter is a sufficiently 
legitimate state interest to survive either “strict scrutiny” or even “rational basis” review is 
one issue that continues to be addressed in the scholarly fallout of the Lawrence decision. 
See, e.g., Suzanne B. Goldberg, Morals-Based Justifications for Lawmaking:  Before and 
After Lawrence v. Texas, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1233, 1236 (2004) (arguing that morality can 
suffice as a legitimate state interest after Lawrence if grounded in empirical fact); Gregory 
Kalscheur, Moral Limits on Morals Legislation:  Lessons for U.S. Constitutional Law from 
the Declaration on Religious Freedom, 16 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 1, 7 (2006) 
(distinguishing between private morality and morality that serves a public order function); 
Arnold H. Loewy, Morals Legislation and the Establishment Clause, 55 ALA. L. REV. 159, 
161 (2003) (distinguishing between “morality simpliciter” and “purposive morality” as 
illegitimate and legitimate justifications, respectively). 
 122. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 586 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 123. See id. at 586, 593–94 (citing, inter alia, Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 
721 (1997)). 
 124. Id. at 594. 
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and arguably supporting a new fundamental right.125  Scalia highlighted the 
inherent illogic of an “emerging awareness” being “deeply rooted,” and 
further rebutted the factual premise of the “emerging awareness” by 
identifying, inter alia, long histories of adultery and prostitution 
proscriptions as counterexamples to the recognition of privacy in “matters 
pertaining to sex.”126 
Justice Scalia, believing that the Court applied a “rational-basis” test, 
thus feared that Lawrence “effectively decrees the end of all morals 
legislation.”127  According to Justice Scalia, “criminal laws against 
fornication, bigamy, adultery, adult incest, bestiality, and obscenity” are no 
longer valid under Lawrence because they are supported by a now-
illegitimate state interest, namely “the promotion of majoritarian sexual 
morality.”128 
c.  The Lawrence-ian Controversy 
As Justice Scalia’s dissent portended, the failure of the Lawrence Court 
to use traditional substantive due process language left room for debate as 
to Lawrence’s holding and its reach.  Did Lawrence announce any 
fundamental right or apply some form of heightened scrutiny?129  Professor 
Laurence H. Tribe argues that, despite not using the exact verbiage, 
Lawrence did indeed apply strict scrutiny, and thus recognized a 
fundamental right.130  Professor Nan Hunter agrees that the Court 
recognized a liberty interest that was on par with a fundamental right, even 
without using the magic words.131 
 
 125. See id. at 594–98. 
 126. See id. at 598. 
 127. See id. at 599. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Lower courts have applied Lawrence inconsistently. Compare Muth v. Frank, 412 
F.3d 808, 817 (7th Cir.) (“Lawrence . . . did not announce . . . a fundamental right . . . for 
adults to engage in all manner of consensual sexual conduct . . . .”), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 
988 (2005), and Lofton v. Sec’y of the Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 
815–17 (11th Cir. 2004) (confining Lawrence to its facts in concluding that “it is a strained 
and ultimately incorrect reading of Lawrence to interpret it to announce a new fundamental 
right”), cert. denied 543 U.S. 1081 (2005), with Cook v. Gates, 528 F.3d 42, 51–52 & n.6 
(1st Cir. 2008) (“[W]e are persuaded that Lawrence did indeed recognize a protected liberty 
interest for adults to engage in private, consensual sexual intimacy . . . .”), cert. denied sub 
nom. Pietrangelo v. Gates, 129 S. Ct. 2763 (2009), and Witt v. Dep’t of the Air Force, 527 
F.3d 806, 816 (9th Cir. 2008) (“We cannot reconcile what the Supreme Court did in 
Lawrence with the minimal protections afforded by traditional rational basis review.”), reh’g 
en banc denied, 548 F.3d 1264 (9th Cir. 2008), and Williams v. Att’y Gen. of Ala., 378 F.3d 
1232, 1254 (11th Cir. 2004) (Barkett, J., dissenting) (“Lawrence . . . affirm[ed] the right of 
consenting adults to make private sexual decisions.”). 
 130. See Tribe, supra note 112, at 1917 & nn.83–84 (citing the Court’s reliance on 
Griswold and Roe, and invocation of “the talismanic verbal formula . . . [albeit] in one 
unusual sequence or another”). 
 131. See Nan D. Hunter, Living with Lawrence, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1103, 1116–17 (2004) 
(arguing that “the Court characterized the sexual rights at issue in Lawrence as equivalent to 
those previously established as fundamental”). 
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If the Court did recognize a right, which right did it recognize?  The 
answer depends on what level of generality one views the Court as having 
framed and analyzed the issue.132  Professor Tribe suggests that Lawrence’s 
language is the broadest, a protection of the intimate relationship itself, 
fleeting though it may have been.133  Professor Dale Carpenter agrees, 
finding Lawrence to support a right to private consensual sex among adults 
generally.134  Others view the protection afforded by Lawrence to be much 
narrower—limited to homosexual sodomy or sodomy per se.135 
By contrast, some scholars agree with Justice Scalia, interpreting 
Lawrence to have announced no new fundamental right.136  Under this 
view, as Justice Scalia suggests, morality alone may indeed no longer be a 
legitimate state interest sufficient to satisfy “rational basis” review.137 
Professor Cass Sunstein proffers a unique interpretation of Lawrence in 
which he, like Professor Tribe, finds the Court’s analysis inviting of a 
“fundamental right”-recognizing interpretation.138  Professor Sunstein, 
however, interprets the right as a unique “desuetude-informed” fundamental 
right, as opposed to simple sexual autonomy. 139  Specifically, in Professor 
Sunstein’s view, the rare enforcement of a law itself—suggesting a lack of 
public support for the law’s underlying purpose—delegitimizes the state’s 
 
 132. The impact of selecting a level of generality is apparent in Michael H. v. Gerald D., 
491 U.S. 110 (1989), a case addressing the parental rights of a man—having sired a child 
with a married woman—given California’s statutory presumption that a child born to 
married parents is a child of the marriage.  Justice Scalia, writing for the plurality, framed 
the issue as a right of “an adulterous natural father,” and accordingly found no fundamental 
right. See id. at 127 & n.6 (plurality opinion).  Justice Brennan, in contrast, argued that the 
right should be framed more broadly, as a right of “parenthood” per se, and thus argued that 
there was indeed a fundamental right at stake. See id. at 139 (Brennan, J., dissenting).  For a 
general discussion, see Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorf, Levels of Generality in the 
Definition of Rights, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1057 (1990). 
 133. See Tribe, supra note 112, at 1904. 
 134. See Dale Carpenter, Is Lawrence Libertarian?, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1140, 1153 (2004) 
(“It is a right . . . of adults to engage in a noncommercial, consensual, sexual relationship in 
private . . . .”); see also Joel P. Cummings, Is Article 125, Sodomy a Dead Letter in Light of 
Lawrence v. Texas and the New Article 120?, 2009 ARMY LAW. 1, 3. 
 135. See, e.g., Katherine M. Franke, The Domesticated Liberty of Lawrence v. Texas, 104 
COLUM. L. REV. 1399, 1400 (2004) (arguing that Lawrence “relies on a narrow version of 
liberty that is both geographized and domesticated—not a robust conception of sexual 
freedom or liberty”). 
 136. See, e.g., Jami Weinstein & Tobyn DeMarco, Challenging Dissent:  The Ontology 
and Logic of Lawrence v. Texas, 10 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 423, 448 (2004) (noting that 
the Court overruled Bowers, which held that there was no fundamental right to commit 
sodomy, and therefore, by failing to explicitly assert a new fundamental right, failed to 
recognize one). 
 137. See supra note 121; see also Michael P. Allen, The Underappreciated First 
Amendment Importance of Lawrence v. Texas, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1045, 1055 (2008) 
(arguing that “Lawrence is best understood as prohibiting lawmaking when morality is the 
sole or dominant justification for acting”). 
 138. See Cass R. Sunstein, What Did Lawrence Hold?, 2003 SUP. CT. REV. 27, 46–48. 
 139. See id. at 50–51. 
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justification when an important interest, like sexual autonomy, is at 
stake.140 
D.  The Freedom of Intimate Association 
Closely related to the substantive due process right of privacy is the 
freedom of intimate association.141  In Roberts v. United States Jaycees,142 
the Supreme Court, addressing state action forcing inclusion of women in 
an all-male organization, identified two types of protected associations:  (1) 
the First Amendment right to associate for the purposes of free speech, 
assembly, and exercise of religion; and (2) the freedom of choice “to enter 
into and maintain certain intimate human relationships” on the other.143  
The latter is relevant to this Note as it deals with “highly personal 
relationships” which are “central to any concept of liberty.”144  The Court, 
citing a number of substantive due process cases, identified the exemplary 
relationships as “those that attend the creation and sustenance of the 
family—marriage, childbirth, the raising and education of children, and 
cohabitation with one’s relatives.”145  The Court distinguished such 
protected relationships from more banal relationships by certain “attributes 
[including] relative smallness, a high degree of selectivity in decisions to 
begin and maintain the affiliation, and seclusion from others in critical 
aspects of the relationship.”146 
Three years later, the Supreme Court affirmed the message of Roberts 
and the Roberts intimate association factors in Board of Directors of Rotary 
International v. Rotary Club of Duarte.147  There, the Court, in another case 
involving forced admission of women into a men-only club, cited Roberts 
in finding no right to intimate association in this context.148  Reiterating the 
factors relevant in determining which intimate relationships are 
protected,149 the Court specifically noted that “constitutional protection is 
 
 140. See id.  Professor Cass Sunstein differentiates this argument from a “freestanding 
desuetude” argument—under which some statutes (e.g., those criminalizing private 
possession of marijuana) could be called into question—on the grounds that there is a 
“constitutionally fundamental interest” at stake. See id. at 51 n.132.  Indeed, the notice-due 
process problem of “freestanding desuetude” is also relevant in adultery. Cf. supra note 7 
and accompanying text (detailing the lack of enforcement of adultery bans). 
 141. See generally Kenneth L. Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 
624 (1980); Nancy Catherine Marcus, The Freedom of Intimate Association in the Twenty 
First Century, 16 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 269 (2006). 
 142. 468 U.S. 609 (1984). 
 143. Id. at 617–18. 
 144. Id. at 618–19. 
 145. Id. at 619 (citations omitted). 
 146. Id. at 620. 
 147. 481 U.S. 537 (1987). 
 148. Id. at 546. 
 149. See id. (“In determining whether a particular association is sufficiently personal or 
private to warrant constitutional protection, we consider factors such as size, purpose, 
selectivity, and whether others are excluded from critical aspects of the relationship.” (citing 
Roberts, 468 U.S. at 620)). 
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[not] restricted to relationships among family members.”150  Thus, between 
Roberts and Rotary International, the Court, at least in dicta, has provided a 
foundation, cumulative to substantive due process, under which an 
adulterous relationship might be analyzed as “intimate” and considered as 
constitutionally protected. 
E.  The Establishment Clause and Personal Liberty 
The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment states that “Congress 
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion.”151  The 
Supreme Court has read and applied the Establishment Clause somewhat 
expansively—not merely as a bar against establishing a state religion,152 but 
also as a mandate to minimize governmental interference and maximize 
individual liberty in matters of religion (or irreligion).153  Although 
commonly considered, along with the Free Exercise Clause, to maintain the 
metaphorical “wall” between church and state,154 the Religion Clauses do 
not exclude religion or religious discourse from the public sphere 
completely.155  Rather, the Establishment Clause serves, inter alia, to 
 
 150. Id. at 545. 
 151. U.S. CONST. amend. I.  The Establishment Clause has been incorporated against the 
states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Cantwell v. 
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940). 
 152. The most ominous state establishment at the time of the Founding was the Church of 
England, and its American progeny. See generally Michael W. McConnell, Establishment 
and Disestablishment at the Founding, Part I:  Establishment of Religion, 44 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 2105, 2107, 2110–30 (2003). 
 153. See McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 860 (2005) (“The touchstone for our 
analysis is the principle that the ‘First Amendment mandates governmental neutrality 
between religion and religion, and between religion and nonreligion.’” (quoting Epperson v. 
Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968))); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 68 (1985) (O’Connor, 
J., concurring) (“Although a distinct jurisprudence has enveloped each of [the Religion] 
Clauses, their common purpose is to secure religious liberty.” (citing Engel v. Vitale, 370 
U.S. 421, 430 (1962))); Epperson, 393 U.S. at 103 (noting that the values embedded in the 
Establishment Clause “are rooted in the foundation soil of our Nation” and “are fundamental 
to freedom”). 
 154. See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 709 n.4 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(“[T]his Court . . . has never questioned the concept of the ‘separation of church and state’ in 
our First Amendment jurisprudence.”). But see Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 606 
(1987) (Powell, J., concurring) (“‘[T]his Nation’s history has not been one of entirely 
sanitized separation between Church and State.’” (quoting Comm. for Pub. Educ. & 
Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 760 (1973))).  Members of the Court have 
reached no consensus on the role of religion in the founding. Compare McCreary, 545 U.S. 
at 887–88 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that “those who wrote the Constitution believed 
that . . . encouragement of religion was the best way to foster morality”), and Wallace, 472 
U.S. at 100–04 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (describing President George Washington’s 
“God”-laden Thanksgiving Day Proclamation given during the time of adoption of the 
Establishment Clause in its current form), with Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 724 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (citing Thomas Jefferson’s refusal, on account of the Establishment Clause, to 
recite Washington’s Thanksgiving Proclamation). 
 155. See McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978) (invalidating a law preventing members 
of the clergy from serving as delegates at Tennessee’s 1977 constitutional convention); cf. 
Wallace, 472 U.S. at 91–106 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (presenting a detailed originalist 
account of the adoption of the Establishment Clause and early scholarship, noting the 
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maintain religious liberty by requiring a true secular purpose for 
government action.156  This section discusses the Establishment Clause’s 
secular purpose requirement, and cases that have invalidated laws under the 
Establishment Clause for lacking such a secular purpose.  This Note will 
derive from this line of Establishment Clause cases what this Note dubs an 
Establishment Clause prism, through which to view the legitimacy of state 
interests in a substantive due process analysis.157 
1.  A Secular Purpose:  The Lemon Test 
In Lemon v. Kurtzman, the Court consolidated its Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence by articulating a three-pronged test for determining whether a 
law respects the establishment of religion in violation of the First 
Amendment.158  “First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; 
second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor 
inhibits religion . . . ; finally, the statute must not foster ‘an excessive 
government entanglement with religion.’”159  Should a law have no secular 
purpose, further inquiry is unnecessary, as the law’s neutrality or lack of 
entanglement is impossible.160  Thus, whether a law has a valid secular 
purpose is a threshold Establishment Clause inquiry. 
In analyzing legislative purpose under the Establishment Clause, the 
Court has also characterized an invalid government action as that which has 
the purpose or effect of “endorsing” religion.161  “Endorsement” is 
problematic as its principal effect is to treat believers as “insiders,” leaving 
non-believers as “outsiders.”162 
Although oft-criticized by members of the Court and scholars alike, the 
Court regularly cites and applies the Lemon and “endorsement” tests.163   
 
pervasive quality of religion and religious values at the time); Michael J. Perry, Why 
Political Reliance on Religiously Grounded Morality Does Not Violate the Establishment 
Clause, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 663, 671 (2001) (suggesting that the Constitution does not 
prevent state action “based on religiously grounded moral belief”). 
 156. See infra text accompanying notes 159–60. 
 157. See infra Part III.  In contrast to other areas of law, legislative purpose or intent is 
the critical determinate of validity under the Establishment Clause. See McDaniel, 435 U.S. 
at 636 n.9; cf. McCreary, 545 U.S. at 865 n.13 (“While heightened deference to legislatures 
is appropriate for the review of economic legislation, an approach that credits any valid 
purpose, no matter how trivial, has not been the way the Court has approached government 
action that implicates establishment.”). 
 158. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
 159. Id. at 612–13 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)) (citing Bd. 
of Educ. v. Allen, 382 U.S. 236, 243 (1968)). 
 160. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56 (1985). 
 161. See Allegheny Cnty. v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 592–93 (1989). 
 162. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring); accord 
McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 860 (2005). 
 163. See, e.g., McCreary, 545 U.S. at 859–60; Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 
668 (2002) (“A central tool in our analysis of cases in this [Establishment Clause] area has 
been the Lemon test.”). But see Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 685–86 (2005) (plurality 
opinion) (citing inconsistent application of the Lemon test).  For an ardent support of the 
secular purpose prong of the Lemon test, see Andrew Koppelman, Secular Purpose, 88 VA. 
L. REV. 87 (2002). 
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2.  The Establishment Clause at Work 
The secular purpose analysis can clearly be seen in the Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence concerning creationism in public schools, prayer in public 
schools, and state displays of the Ten Commandments.  This section 
illustrates the Court’s approach to these three issues. 
a.  Creationism in Public Schools 
In Epperson v. Arkansas,164 the Court addressed an Establishment Clause 
challenge to the constitutionality of an Arkansas law prohibiting the 
teaching of evolution in public schools.165  The Court found that the 
statute’s sole purpose was to quash school teachings that conflicted with 
religious doctrine.166  The Court reached this conclusion by examining in 
detail the objective legislative purpose of the enactment, as evidenced by 
the surrounding facts and circumstances.167  For example, a newspaper 
advertisement used to garner public support for the enactment forewarned:  
“Shall conscientious church members be forced to pay taxes to support 
teachers to teach evolution which will undermine the faith of their 
children?”168  The Court rejected any argument of “neutrality,” and, finding 
no secular purpose, struck down the law.169 
In Edwards v. Aguillard,170 the Court revisited a more “neutral” version 
of the statute at issue in Epperson.  In Edwards, the statute did not proscribe 
the teaching of evolution outright, but instead required that evolution, if 
taught at all, be taught alongside “creation science.”171  As in Epperson, the 
Court scrutinized the actual legislative purpose of the statute through a 
detailed examination of the legislative history.172  Although the statute’s 
 
  An inquiry into the validity of the Lemon test is outside this Note’s scope.  For a 
discussion of the three-pronged Establishment Clause doctrine under Lemon, see Scott C. 
Idleman, Religious Premises, Legislative Judgments, and the Establishment Clause, 12 
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1 (2002). 
 164. 393 U.S. 97 (1968). 
 165. Id. at 98. 
 166. See id. at 103. 
 167. See id. at 107–09. 
 168. Id. at 108 n.16.  The ad opened with the admonition:  “All atheists favor evolution.  
If you agree with atheism vote against [the law].  If you agree with the Bible vote for [the 
law].” Id.  This sort of proselytizing is exactly the kind of endorsement that supports the 
insider/outsider dichotomy. See supra notes 161–62 and accompanying text.  Professor 
Abner S. Greene dubs this a “reference to an extrahuman source of value, of normative 
authority,” which serves to exclude non-believers from meaningful dialogue. See Abner S. 
Greene, The Political Balance of the Religion Clauses, 102 YALE L.J. 1611, 1617, 1621 
(1993). 
 169. See Epperson, 393 U.S. at 109 (holding that the law “cannot be defended as an act of 
religious neutrality” because it “did not seek to excise . . . all discussion of the origin of 
man” from public schools). 
 170. 482 U.S. 578 (1987). 
 171. Id. at 581.  The statute defined “creation science” as “the scientific evidences for 
creation and inferences from those scientific evidences.” LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:286.3(2) 
(1982). 
 172. See Edwards, 482 U.S. at 591–93. 
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express purpose was “to protect academic freedom,”173 the Court found this 
to be a sham purpose,174 and concluded that the law’s objectively true 
purpose “was to restructure the science curriculum to conform with a 
particular religious viewpoint.”175  The Court thus invalidated the law as 
violating the Establishment Clause.176 
b.  Prayer in Public Schools 
In Wallace v. Jaffree,177 the Supreme Court addressed an Establishment 
Clause challenge to an Alabama statute authorizing a period of silence for 
meditation or voluntary prayer in public schools.178  As with the 
creationism cases, the Court scrutinized the governmental purpose 
evidenced by the legislative history of the enactment.179  The Court found 
that the statute’s purpose was to return prayer to public schools, and thus 
concluded that, because prayer is religious on its face, the statute had no 
secular purpose.180  Instead, the Court invalidated the statute, finding that it 
endorsed religion by characterizing prayer as a favored practice.181 
c.  The Ten Commandments on Public Property 
The State’s posting of the Ten Commandments in schools or on public 
property has prompted Establishment Clause challenges because, like 
prayer, the Decalogue is inherently religious.  At issue in Stone v. 
Graham182 was a Kentucky statute requiring the posting of the Ten 
Commandments in every public school classroom.183  Despite the statute’s 
 
 173. Id. at 586 (citing LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:286.2 (1982)). 
 174. Id. at 586–87; see id. at 587 (reasoning that neither eliminating evolution and 
creationism from curricula nor requiring both advances academic freedom because it either 
undermines comprehensive scientific education by elimination or provides no authority that 
was not already available to choose curricula). 
 175. Id. at 593. But cf. Stephen L. Carter, Evolutionism, Creationism, and Treating 
Religion As a Hobby, 1987 DUKE L.J. 977, 981 (arguing that creationism and creation 
science are not necessarily entirely non-secular, and “that there is a nontrivial hermeneutic 
and a rational application of it behind the creationist rejection of evolutionary theory”). 
 176. Although secular purpose alone will not save a statute, neither will “a religious 
purpose alone” invalidate it; “[t]he religious purpose must predominate.” See Edwards, 482 
U.S. at 599 (Powell, J., concurring) (citing Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56 (1985); Lynch 
v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 608, 681 n.6 (1984)).  The fact that a law aligns with a religious belief, 
inadvertently or otherwise, is not enough to run afoul of the Establishment Clause. See 
Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 319 (1980) (citing McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 
442 (1961)). 
 177. 472 U.S. 38 (1985). 
 178. Id. at 41–42. 
 179. See id. at 56–60. 
 180. See id. at 59. But see Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983) (upholding legislative 
prayer as constitutional, primarily because of its long-established history, particularly during 
the time of adoption of the Bill of Rights). 
 181. See Wallace, 472 U.S. at 61. 
 182. 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (per curiam), reh’g denied, 449 U.S. 1104 (1981). 
 183. Id. at 39. 
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express pretense of secularity,184 the Court concluded that “[t]he Ten 
Commandments are undeniably a sacred text in the Jewish and Christian 
faiths, and no legislative recitation of a supposed secular purpose can blind 
us to that fact.”185 
More recently, in McCreary County v. ACLU of Kentucky,186 the Court 
upheld a lower court’s preliminary injunction enjoining the posting of the 
Ten Commandments in county courthouses as unconstitutionally 
evidencing a “predominantly religious purpose” in violation of the 
Establishment Clause.187  The Court reaffirmed the importance of a detailed 
inquiry into legislative purpose,188 and proceeded to analyze the counties’ 
manifest objective purpose.189  The Court found that “[t]he reasonable 
observer could only think that the Counties meant to emphasize and 
celebrate the Commandments’ religious message,” and thus invalidated the 
law under the Establishment Clause.190 
As these cases demonstrate, the Establishment Clause necessitates a 
detailed inquiry into the legislative purpose of an enactment to seek out an 
objectively true secular purpose and to ensure that no religious purpose 
predominates.191 
II.  ADULTERY BANS AND TRADITIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINE:  
SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS, INTIMATE ASSOCIATION, AND 
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE ARGUMENTS 
Part II of this Note proceeds to examine the various positions on the 
question of the constitutionality of adultery bans.  Part II.A sets forth the 
“traditional” substantive due process approaches to adultery bans, 
examining both the “fundamental right” and the “state interest” poles of the 
 
 184. See id. at 41 (“‘The secular application of the Ten Commandments is clearly seen in 
its adoption as the fundamental legal code of Western Civilization and the Common Law of 
the United States.’” (quoting KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 158.178 (LexisNexis 1980))). 
 185. Id. (footnote omitted). 
 186. 545 U.S. 844 (2005). 
 187. Id. at 851–52, 881. 
 188. See id. at 862 (“[S]crutinizing purpose does make practical sense . . . where an 
understanding of official objective emerges from readily discoverable fact, without any 
judicial psychoanalysis of a drafter’s heart of hearts.” (citing Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 
74 (1985) (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment))); cf. id. at 867 (“[U]nder the 
Establishment Clause detail is the key.” (citing Allegheny Cnty. v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 
595 (1989))). 
 189. See id. at 868–69 (noting similarities to the displays in Stone, the lack of religious 
disclaimer, and the presence of the county executive’s pastor at their posting in finding no 
secular purpose). 
 190. Id. at 869. 
 191. But see Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 690–92 (2005) (plurality opinion) 
(avoiding an express analysis of the governmental purpose in upholding the legitimacy of a 
Ten Commandments monument on public grounds, because of its “dual significance, 
partaking of both religion and government”); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 449 
(1961) (holding that Sunday closing laws do not violate the Establishment Clause because, 
despite the unmistakably religious motivation of the original enactment, a secular purpose 
had evolved such that the law’s effect was no longer “to aid religion but to set aside a day of 
rest and recreation”). 
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calculus.  Part II.B discusses whether and how an adulterous relationship 
has been treated as an intimate association under Roberts.  Finally, Part II.C 
discusses how adultery might be analyzed under Establishment Clause 
doctrine. 
A.  Substantive Due Process 
The line of cases from Griswold through Casey shows that the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment places at least some 
constitutional limits on a state’s ability to regulate certain intimate 
conduct.192  The Lawrence decision specifically limits the state’s ability to 
regulate some, but not necessarily all, private consensual sexual activity 
among adults.193  This section presents the substantive due process 
arguments regarding the constitutionality of criminal adultery bans.  Part 
II.A.1 examines the first aspect of the inquiry:  Is there a fundamental right 
to adulter?  Part II.A.2 examines the second aspect of the inquiry:  what the 
state’s interests in regulating adultery are, and whether such state interests 
are sufficient to withstand either “strict scrutiny” or “rational basis” review. 
1.  Is There a Fundamental Right To Adulter? 
Courts, in order to determine whether a fundamental right is at stake, 
most often apply the Palko formulation, and ask if the asserted right is 
“implicit in the concept of ordered liberty” and/or “deeply rooted in our 
history and traditions.”194  The level of generality at which the asserted 
right is framed is often determinative.195  Thus, whether the right is framed 
broadly, as a right to sexual privacy, or more narrowly, as a right to adulter, 
often pre-determines the outcome of the fundamental rights analysis.196 
 
 192. See supra notes 88–99 and accompanying text. 
 193. See supra Part I.C.2.a. 
 194. See supra notes 84–85 and accompanying text. 
 195. See supra notes 132–35 and accompanying text. 
 196. This is the very mistake the Lawrence Court attributes to the Bowers Court. See 
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003).  The Bowers Court framed the liberty interest 
narrowly as “a fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy.” See Bowers v. 
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986).  Read in that way, the Court found no such liberty 
interest “deeply rooted in this Nation’s tradition” or “implicit in the concept of ordered 
liberty,” and instead found a long-standing history of quite the opposite—the criminalization 
of such conduct. See id. at 192–94.  The Lawrence Court, by contrast, approached the issue 
more broadly, analyzing the asserted liberty interest as a right for adults to “decid[e] how to 
conduct their private lives in matters pertaining to sex.” See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 572; see 
also Bowers, 478 U.S. at 218 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (identifying the relevant liberty as a 
“right to engage in nonreproductive, sexual conduct that others may consider offensive or 
immoral”). 
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a.  Arguments Supporting a Fundamental Right 
The Virginia Supreme Court, in a case involving a challenge to 
Virginia’s fornication statute, has interpreted Lawrence broadly.197  In 
Martin v. Ziherl, the court viewed Lawrence as upholding a right “to enter 
and maintain a personal relationship without governmental interference.”198  
Thus, framing the right infringed by the fornication statute as the right to 
engage in “certain private sexual conduct between two consenting adults,” 
the court invalidated Virginia’s fornication statute.199  Although the Martin 
decision addressed fornication, not adultery, the similarities of the two 
offenses and the broad characterization of the right at issue suggest that an 
analogous application to adultery bans is appropriate.200  Specifically, under 
this view, adultery would be encompassed by a general right to sexual 
privacy that Lawrence recognized.201 
Several commentators agree that adultery is properly characterized as 
falling within a broad right to sexual privacy recognized by Lawrence.202  
Some have even found adultery to fall within a general fundamental right to 
privacy espoused by the Court in its pre-Lawrence jurisprudence.203 
Even if the fundamental right is framed narrowly, as a right to adulter 
(i.e., a right to have consensual sex with another while married), plausible 
arguments remain for considering such a right as “deeply rooted.”  For 
example, despite the “ancient roots” of adultery proscriptions, adultery too 
has a long history, even among government leaders, including a number of 
 
 197. See Martin v. Ziherl, 607 S.E.2d 367 (Va. 2005).  The challenge arose in an unusual 
context—the plaintiff was seeking damages in tort for injuries inflicted during sexual 
intercourse with the defendant. Id. at 368.  Under Virginia common law, no plaintiff could 
recover damages in tort for injuries suffered while participating in an illegal activity. Id.  
Because both parties were unmarried at the time of the sexual intercourse which led to the 
injury, the plaintiff was allegedly in violation of Virginia’s fornication statute, and was thus 
unable to recover unless the statute was invalid. See id. at 369. 
 198. Id. at 369 (citing Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567). But see id. at 370 (“The Supreme 
Court did not consider the liberty right vindicated in Lawrence as a fundamental 
constitutional right . . . .”).  This Janus-like reading of Lawrence appears to be a 
hybridization of the traditional due process calculus. See infra notes 251–53 and 
accompanying text. 
 199. See Martin, 607 S.E.2d at 371; accord Hobbs v. Smith, No. 05 CVS 267, 2006 WL 
3103008, at *1 & n.1 (N.C. Super. Ct. Aug. 25, 2006) (striking down North Carolina’s 
fornication statute as a violation of “plaintiff’s substantive due process right to liberty as 
explained in [Lawrence]”). 
 200. See Thong v. Andre Chreky Salon, 634 F. Supp. 2d 40, 46–47 (D.D.C. 2009) 
(finding nothing in Martin to limit its holding to fornication, and implying that it could also 
apply to adultery); see also supra note 10. 
 201. See supra notes 129–34 and accompanying text. 
 202. See Jennifer A. Herold, Note, A Breach of Vows but Not Criminal:  Does Lawrence 
v. Texas Invalidate Utah’s Statute Criminalizing Adultery?, 7 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 253, 259 
(2005); Gabrielle Viator, Note, The Validity of Criminal Adultery Prohibitions After 
Lawrence v. Texas, 39 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 837, 853–54 (2006).  Broad characterization is 
consistent with Professor Laurence H. Tribe’s reading of Lawrence. See supra notes 130–33 
and accompanying text. 
 203. See, e.g., Phyllis Coleman, Who’s Been Sleeping in My Bed?  You and Me, and the 
State Makes Three, 24 IND. L. REV. 399, 404–08 (1991); Siegel, supra note 44, at 82–86. 
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U.S. Presidents and at least one Founding Father.204  Although “rights” are 
not necessarily equivalent to “practices,” the more pervasive an activity is, 
the harder to distinguish between that which is “deeply rooted” and that 
which is simply widespread.  Nevertheless, the pervasiveness of adultery in 
our culture today may too reflect an “emerging awareness” that Lawrence 
recognized as relevant to the analysis.205 
b.  Arguments Supporting No Fundamental Right 
By contrast, many courts have interpreted Lawrence as announcing no 
new fundamental right, thus arguably confining Lawrence’s liberty interest 
to the specific acts at issue (sodomy or homosexual sodomy), and 
suggesting that adultery may not be constitutionally protected.206  Under 
this view—that Lawrence changed nothing outside of the particular sexual 
conduct at issue—the pre-Lawrence analysis of adultery laws by some 
courts is instructive.  In 1983, the Massachusetts Supreme Court directly 
addressed a substantive due process challenge to the constitutionality of a 
criminal adultery ban in Commonwealth v. Stowell.207  The court, 
addressing a facial challenge to the statute, first concluded that the Supreme 
Court had recognized a fundamental right to privacy “relating to marriage, 
procreation, and family relations.”208  Framing the asserted right 
narrowly—analogous to Bowers209—and citing several federal district court 
opinions in support, the court held that “there is no fundamental personal 
privacy right implicit in the concept of ordered liberty barring the 
prosecution of consenting adults committing adultery in private.”210 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit recently reached 
a similar conclusion regarding adultery by framing the asserted liberty as “a 
right to engage in an intimate sexual relationship with the spouse of 
another.”211  In Marcum v. McWhorter, the Sixth Circuit relied primarily on 
the historical criminalization of adultery to conclude that adultery was not a 
fundamental right.212  By narrowly framing the asserted right, some courts 
 
 204. See, e.g., BILL CLINTON, MY LIFE 773–74 (2004) (admitting his extramarital affair 
with Monica Lewinsky while in office); GORDON-REED, supra note 5, at 186–87 (affair of 
Thomas Jefferson). See generally CHARLES W. DUNN, THE SCARLET THREAD OF SCANDAL:  
MORALITY AND THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY (2000) (describing the extramarital affairs of 
Warren G. Harding, Woodrow Wilson, John F. Kennedy, and other U.S. Presidents). 
 205. See supra notes 1–5, 115 and accompanying text. 
 206. See supra notes 129, 135. 
 207. 449 N.E.2d 357 (Mass. 1983). 
 208. Id. at 359.  The Court cited, among others, Meyer, Skinner, Griswold, Eisenstadt, 
Roe, and Loving. See supra notes 86–98 and accompanying text. 
 209. See supra note 196. 
 210. Stowell, 449 N.E.2d at 360 (citations omitted). 
 211. See Marcum v. McWhorter, 308 F.3d 635, 641–42 (6th Cir. 2002); see also infra 
notes 259–63 and accompanying text. 
 212. See Marcum, 308 F.3d at 641–42 (comparing adultery to sodomy in a Bowers-like 
argument, and noting that “proscriptions against adultery have ancient roots”). But see 
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 571–72 (2003) (relying on “an emerging awareness” 
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have been able to rely on the lengthy history of criminally punishing 
adultery—in this country and elsewhere213—in supporting their conclusion 
that there is no fundamental right to adultery.214 
2.  The State’s Interest in Banning Adultery 
If there is a fundamental right infringed by an adultery ban, a court would 
apply a strict scrutiny standard and ask whether there is a compelling state 
interest in banning adultery and whether the ban is narrowly tailored to 
meet that interest.215  If, on the other hand, there is no fundamental right 
implicated, a court would instead apply a rational basis review, searching 
only for a legitimate state purpose to which the ban is rationally related.216  
Whatever a court decides, its analysis must include an investigation of the 
state’s interest in and purpose for banning adultery. 
a.  Arguments That the State’s Interest Is Legitimate or Compelling 
The regulation of matters involving marriage has always been the 
province of the police power of the states—from the minimum age to the 
minimum degree of consanguinity to the grounds for divorce.217  
Additionally, the states, under their sovereign police power, have the 
authority to propound laws and regulations to protect the health and safety 
of their citizens.218  Accordingly, to the extent that adultery is an act that 
causes harm to the institution of marriage, or to individuals involved in that 
institution (e.g., spouses and children), the state’s interest in banning 
adultery is at least facially legitimate and possibly compelling. 
When adultery is committed, the non-participating spouse may be 
harmed “as a matter of law, biology, and economics.”219  Specifically, 
adultery may violate a spouse’s legal right inherent in the marital contract 
(i.e., a “legal right to fidelity.”). 220  As the creator of this legal right, and as 
 
regarding aspects of sexual conduct, flying in the face of the “historical grounds relied upon 
in Bowers”). 
 213. See supra Part I.B.1. 
 214. See Oliverson v. W. Valley City, 875 F. Supp. 1465, 1473–75, 1482 (D. Utah 1995) 
(providing an extensive account of the history of adultery laws and concluding that “[t]he 
historical development of the criminalization of adultery is directly opposite to any aspect of 
an historical right”); Owens v. State, 724 A.2d 43, 53 (Md. 1999) (noting, in dicta, that “a 
person has no constitutional right to engage in sexual intercourse, at least outside of 
marriage”); City of Sherman v. Henry, 928 S.W.2d 464, 470–72 (Tex. 1996) (citing ancient 
and current criminal proscriptions of, as well as current civil burdens to engaging in, 
adultery). 
 215. See supra text accompanying note 82. 
 216. See supra text accompanying note 83. 
 217. See supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
 218. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973) (recognizing a compelling state 
interest in protecting the health of a pregnant woman). 
 219. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DISHONORABLE PASSIONS:  SODOMY LAWS IN 
AMERICA, 1861–2003, at 340 (2008). 
 220. See id. 
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the provider of benefits on account of that legal right,221 the state may be 
justified in regulating violations of that legal right.222  Furthermore, 
adultery may cause both emotional trauma and physical harm by increasing 
the risk of the spread of sexually-transmitted diseases to the innocent 
spouse.223  Adultery can therefore be seen as an “offense against the 
spouse,”224 whom the state has a legitimate interest in protecting. 
A state may also have a legitimate interest in protecting the “traditional 
institution of marriage.”225  Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, concurring in the 
judgment of Lawrence, specifically asserted that “preserving the traditional 
institution of marriage” can be a legitimate state interest.226  She is not the 
only Supreme Court Justice to hold this view.227 
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in Stowell took judicial notice 
“that the act of adultery frequently has a destructive impact on the marital 
relationship and is a factor in many divorces.”228  Indeed, adultery is 
recognized as ground for divorce in a majority of states,229 and in a fault-
based state, adultery is often the only viable ground for divorce.230  Banning 
 
 221. See supra Part I.A.2. 
 222. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 209 n.4 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) 
(“A State might define the contractual commitment necessary to become eligible for these 
[government] benefits to include a commitment of [marital] fidelity and then punish 
individuals for breaching that contract.”).  Professor Tribe contrasts such protection of 
marriage with sodomy laws like that invalidated by Lawrence, that is laws that “cut [a] wide 
swath through the population to limit the options open to any particular oppressed minority.” 
See Tribe, supra note 112, at 1944. 
 223. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 219, at 340; Siegel, supra note 44, at 87 (describing the 
prevention of disease as one of the “doubtless compelling goals of any government”); cf. 
Traci Shallbetter Stratton, No More Messing Around:  Substantive Due Process Challenges 
to State Laws Prohibiting Fornication, 73 WASH. L. REV. 767, 797 (1998) (arguing that 
fornication statutes, and by extension adultery statutes, advance a “state’s interests in 
preventing disease and extramarital births, protecting the institution of marriage, and 
promoting morality”). 
 224. See United States v. Taylor, 64 M.J. 416, 417, 420 (C.A.A.F. 2007) (characterizing 
adultery as “a crime against the person of the other spouse,” and thus precluding spousal 
immunity under military evidence rules). 
 225. The protection of the “traditional” institution of marriage is an oft-cited reason for 
opposing the recognition of same-sex marriage. See, e.g., Jeremy W. Peters, New York 
Senate Turns Back Bill on Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2009, at A1 (quoting Richard 
E. Barnes, director of New York’s Catholic Conference, as saying “Americans continue to 
understand marriage the way it has always been understood”); see also H.R. REP. NO. 104-
664, at 2 (1996) (citing the defense of the “institution of traditional heterosexual marriage” 
as a purpose of the Defense of Marriage Act), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905, 2906. 
 226. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 585 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring in the 
judgment). 
 227. See, e.g., Bowers, 478 U.S. at 217 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[Society] also may 
prevent an individual from interfering with, or violating, a legally sanctioned and protected 
relationship, such as marriage.”). 
 228. Commonwealth v. Stowell, 449 N.E.2d 357, 360 (Mass. 1983); see supra notes 207–
10 and accompanying text. 
 229. See POSNER & SILBAUGH, supra note 9, at 103–10 (collecting statutes). 
 230. For an attack on New York’s recently-repealed fault-based divorce laws, including a 
discussion of the harms inherent in a divorce proceeding in which adultery is pled, see 
Rhona Bork, Note, Taking Fault with New York’s Fault-Based Divorce:  Is the Law 
Constitutional?, 16 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 165, 169–72 (2002). 
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adultery may serve as a deterrent to divorce in cases involving marital 
infidelity, which “often rips apart families.”231  Adultery thus harms not 
only the marriage itself, but also the children of a marriage.232 
Given these harms, states may argue that their interest is not only 
legitimate, but also compelling.233  For example, in Oliverson v. West 
Valley City,234 the District Court for the District of Utah in a lengthy 
opinion found the prevention of adultery to be a compelling state interest.235  
Specifically, the court identified prevention of harm to innocent parties 
(e.g., the spouse and children) and minimization of social costs (e.g., spread 
of disease, unwanted children, and the disruption of the family, “a positive 
social and economic unit and force in society”) as sufficiently compelling 
interests.236  To the extent that an adultery ban is at least rationally related 
to these interests—a proposition which is almost self-evident—such bans 
may survive at least rational basis review. 
b.  Arguments That the State’s Interest Cannot Survive Strict Scrutiny or 
Rational Basis Review 
Assuming that the state’s interest in regulating adultery is compelling, an 
adultery ban may nevertheless fail strict scrutiny because adultery bans are 
not narrowly drawn to meet the state interest.237  For example, regarding 
prevention of disease and unwanted children, an adultery ban is severely 
under-inclusive—any sexual intercourse, adulterous or otherwise, may lead 
to both harms.238  Similarly, regarding the prevention of harm (to the 
spouse, the family, and the institution of marriage), an adultery ban is both 
over-inclusive (e.g., couples may agree to open polyamorous marriages239) 
and under-inclusive (e.g., infidelity not involving sexual intercourse may 
nonetheless cause equivalent harm and may be just as likely to break up a 
marriage240).241  Additionally, an adultery ban may be ineffective in 
 
 231. City of Sherman v. Henry, 928 S.W.2d 464, 470 (Tex. 1996). 
 232. See Oliverson v. W. Valley City, 875 F. Supp. 1465, 1484 (D. Utah 1995) (“The 
results [of adultery] can be tragic and the social costs may impact innocent children and 
relatives.”); see also ESKRIDGE, supra note 219, at 340. See generally ANNETTE LAWSON, 
ADULTERY:  AN ANALYSIS OF LOVE AND BETRAYAL (1988). 
 233. See Siegel, supra note 44, at 87. 
 234. 875 F. Supp. 1465 (D. Utah 1995). 
 235. See id. at 1485. 
 236. Id. at 1484–85; see also Roberts v. Roberts, 586 S.E.2d 290, 295 (Va. Ct. App. 
2003) (noting that the protection of children from any harm, including physical, emotional, 
and moral, is a compelling state interest (citing Knox v. Lynchburg Div. of Soc. Servs., 288 
S.E.2d 399, 404 (Va. 1982))). 
 237. See supra text accompanying note 82. 
 238. See Siegel, supra note 44, at 87–88; cf. Oliverson, 875 F. Supp. at 1484 (impliedly 
recognizing the under-inclusiveness by reasoning that “adultery may be more deterrable than 
fornication”). 
 239. See generally Emens, supra note 14 (juxtaposing polyamorous relationships with 
traditional monogamous marriage). 
 240. Cf. Cossman, supra note 1, at 276–80 (arguing for an expansive understanding of 
adultery to cover non-sexual acts of infidelity that can lead to these harms). But cf. In re 
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preventing the harms, as infidelity may be the result, not the cause, of 
marital difficulties.242 
The state’s interest in regulating adultery, however, may be neither 
compelling nor legitimate.  For example, recent scholarship suggests that, in 
contrast to conventional wisdom, fracture of the family unit does not 
necessarily result in harm to the children.243  Furthermore, absence of 
regular enforcement of a law can itself suggest illegitimacy of purpose.244  
Adultery laws are rarely if ever enforced,245 a fact that itself defeats an 
adultery law’s own purportedly deterrent purpose.246  Indeed, the failure of 
deterrence is evidenced by the sheer ubiquity of marital infidelity.247  
Finally, the state’s actual purpose in banning adultery may not necessarily 
align with plausibly legitimate interests discussed in Part II.A.2.a.  For 
example, to the extent that the actual purpose evidenced by legislative 
history controls, as opposed to a later-asserted serendipitous purpose, then 
New York’s adultery statute may not be supported by a legitimate state 
interest.248 
c.  The Lawrence Hybrid:  Arguments That No State Interest Is Legitimate 
When Balanced Against Sexual Liberty 
As discussed in Part I.C.2, the enigmatic Lawrence decision opened the 
door for a new type of substantive due process analysis when dealing with 
sexual liberty.249  Lawrence’s key holding—that Texas’s sodomy statute 
“furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the 
 
Blanchflower, 834 A.2d 1010, 1012 (N.H. 2003) (holding that lesbian intimacy does not 
constitute adultery). 
 241. See Siegel, supra note 44, at 89–90. 
 242. See Denise Previti & Paul R. Amato, Is Infidelity a Cause or Consequence of Poor 
Marital Quality?, 21 J. SOC. & PERS. RELATIONSHIPS 217 (2004) (studying nearly 1500 
individuals over a period of seventeen years and concluding that “infidelity is both a cause 
and a consequence of relationship deterioration”). 
 243. Martha Albertson Fineman, Progress and Progression in Family Law, 2004 U. CHI. 
LEGAL F. 1, 15 (arguing that existing divorce studies failed to look at long-term 
consequences, and when the consequences were examined over the long-term, the majority 
of children “looked a lot like their contemporaries from non-divorced homes” (citing E. 
MAVIS HETHERINGTON & JOHN KELLY, FOR BETTER OR FOR WORSE:  DIVORCE RECONSIDERED 
7 (2002))). 
 244. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 502 (1961) (plurality opinion) (“‘Deeply 
embedded traditional ways of carrying out state policy . . .’—or not carrying it out—‘are 
often tougher and truer law than the dead words of the written text.’” (quoting Nashville, 
Chattanooga & St. Louis Ry. v. Browning, 310 U.S. 362, 369 (1940)) (alteration in 
original)); Sunstein, supra note 138, at 54 (noting that such rarely enforced laws are able to 
persist “only because [they are] enforced so rarely”). 
 245. See supra note 7. 
 246. See Mascherin et al., supra note 7, at 748. 
 247. See Coleman, supra note 203, at 410–11; see also supra notes 1–5 and 
accompanying text. 
 248. See supra Part I.B.2.b (describing the outcry from the Christian establishment and 
the interest in avoiding the appearance of immorality leading to the enactment of New 
York’s current adultery ban). 
 249. See supra Part I.C.2. 
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personal and private life of the individual”250—suggests that a hybrid 
comparison may be required.  That is, the legitimacy of the state interest 
may depend on the nature of the privacy into which it intrudes. 
The Virginia Supreme Court, addressing Virginia’s fornication statute, 
characterized this hybridization as a form of rational basis that “sweeps 
within it all manner of states’ interests and finds them insufficient when 
measured against the intrusion upon a person’s liberty interest when that 
interest is exercised in the form of private, consensual sexual conduct 
between adults.”251  The Martin court thus addressed the arguably 
legitimate state interests of fostering procreation in wedlock and preventing 
the spread of disease, and dismissed them outright under Lawrence, without 
even analyzing their legitimacy.252  The Virginia Supreme Court, in 
invalidating a statute regulating private consensual sexual conduct under 
Lawrence, therefore appears to have both elevated the right at stake253 and 
simultaneously delegitimized facially legitimate state interests. 
B.  Is Adultery a Protected Intimate Association? 
The right to certain intimate associations free from state intrusion 
identified in Roberts suggests that adulterous relationships, which often can 
be products of deep love (despite being affronts to marriage), may be 
constitutionally protected.254  The intimate association aspects of an extra-
marital affair led one court to conclude that a particular adulterous 
relationship was constitutionally protected, despite a local criminal adultery 
ban.255  In Starling v. Board of County Commissioners, the plaintiff alleged 
that he was demoted from his position as Captain in the Fire Department 
because he was having an adulterous affair.256  Going through the Roberts 
factors, the magistrate judge found that the relationship was formed with 
the goal of marriage, involved a small number of people, and was exclusive 
of others (i.e., monogamous), and thus found the relationship to be 
constitutionally protected.257  Even lacking marriage, the quintessential 
monogamous relationship, an adulterous affair can satisfy most of the 
 
 250. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003). 
 251. Martin v. Ziherl, 607 S.E.2d 367, 370 (Va. 2005). 
 252. See id. (“Lawrence indicated that such policies are insufficient to sustain the 
statute’s constitutionality.” (citing Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578)). 
 253. Compare the “threshold” of “a constitutionally fundamental interest” (as opposed to 
a fundamental right) of Sunstein, supra note 138, at 51 & n.132. See supra note 140. 
 254. See supra Part I.D. 
 255. See Starling v. Bd. Of Cnty. Comm’rs, No. 08-80008-Civ, 2009 WL 248369, at *6 
(S.D. Fla. Jan. 2, 2009) (report and recommendation of magistrate judge), report rejected on 
other grounds, 2009 WL 281051 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 2, 2009). 
 256. See id. at *1 & n.1. 
 257. See id. at *6.  The magistrate judge seemed to be persuaded because the initially 
adulterous relationship was ultimately consummated as a legal marriage. See id. at *1, *6. 
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Roberts factors, particularly if the relationship is more than a casual 
fling.258 
Several courts, however, have declined to extend such protection to 
adultery.  In Marcum v. McWhorter, the plaintiff, a Kentucky Sheriff, 
alleged that he was fired from his office as a result of his affair with a 
married woman.259  The lower court rejected the plaintiff’s discrimination 
claim, and the Sixth Circuit affirmed.260  The Sixth Circuit reviewed the 
Roberts and Rotary Club factors and noted that the defendant’s relationship 
met most of them.261  The “adulterous nature of the relationship,” however, 
dissuaded the Court from finding that the relationship was constitutionally 
protected.262  Specifically, the Marcum court held that an adulterous 
relationship per se cannot be compared to those relationships “that lie at the 
core of traditional notions of individual liberty” because “adulterous 
conduct is the very antithesis of marriage and family.”263  A later panel of 
the Sixth Circuit indicated that Lawrence did not alter this analysis.264 
C.  Adultery Bans and the Establishment Clause 
The Establishment Clause prevents the government from, inter alia, 
passing laws with no objectively secular purpose—laws that have the 
purpose and effect of endorsing religion.265  Both marriage itself and 
adultery bans have unavoidably religious roots, particularly in this 
country.266  Furthermore, morality, one of the reasons cited for 
criminalizing adultery,267 is often grounded in religious values.268  Whether 
morality alone is a legitimate state interest for substantive due process 
 
 258. See Siegel, supra note 44, at 77–78 (identifying factors including fostering diversity, 
providing emotional sustenance, and relative smallness as no less present in an intimate and 
adulterous relationship than in an intimate non-adulterous relationship such as marriage). 
 259. Marcum v. McWhorter, 308 F.3d 635, 637 (6th Cir. 2002). 
 260. Id. 
 261. See id. at 640 (accepting Marcum’s arguments “that the association was relatively 
small—just the two of them; highly selective in the decision to begin and maintain the 
affiliation; and others were secluded from the relationship” and noting that these factors 
“may weigh in favor of finding a protected relationship”). 
 262. See id. at 641. 
 263. Id. at 642–43 (quoting Mercure v. Van Buren Twp., 81 F. Supp. 2d 814, 823 (E.D. 
Mich. 2000)); see Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 620 (1984) (describing 
freedom of association as “an intrinsic element of personal liberty”); accord Caruso v. City 
of Cocoa, 260 F. Supp. 2d 1191 (M.D. Fla. 2003) (parroting the Marcum analysis in a case 
with similar facts). 
 264. See Beecham v. Henderson Cnty., 422 F.3d 372, 376 (6th Cir. 2005) (“[W]e are 
doubtful . . . that our decision in Marcum was overruled by Lawrence.”); see also Matthew 
W. Green, Jr., Lawrence:  An Unlikely Catalyst for Massive Disruption in the Sphere of 
Government Employee Privacy and Intimate Association Claims, 29 BERKELEY J. EMP. & 
LAB. L. 311, 338–40 (2008) (arguing that Lawrence does not extend intimate association 
protection to police officers engaged in adulterous conduct). 
 265. See supra Part I.E. 
 266. See supra Part I.A–I.B.1. 
 267. See supra text accompanying note 74. 
 268. See generally WILLIAM J. WAINWRIGHT, RELIGION AND MORALITY (2005). 
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purposes is an open question after Lawrence.269  Although posed in the 
context of the “rational basis” standard of the substantive due process 
calculus, this question nevertheless begs consideration of purpose (i.e., 
secular or religious?) in view of Establishment Clause values.270 
Professor Scott C. Idleman has argued that laws “informed by religious 
moral premises generally do not, by that fact alone, violate the 
[Establishment Clause of the] First Amendment.”271  Professor Arnold H. 
Loewy has examined laws criminalizing adultery under the Establishment 
Clause and has concluded that they are valid in some instances.272  Under 
Professor Loewy’s test, laws “predicated on purposive morality, i.e., 
morality that serves a secular function,” are valid.273  Applying this test to 
criminal adultery laws, Professor Loewy concludes that they are not 
unconstitutional, because “[a]dultery can devastate people of all religious 
beliefs, as well as people bereft of religion.”274 
Nevertheless, laws predicated on arguably religious morality do raise 
questions under the Establishment Clause.  Justice Harry Blackmun, for 
example, in his dissent from Bowers, criticized as illegitimate one of the 
state’s rationales for regulating sodomy—that the conduct is morally 
reprehensible as evidenced by Judeo-Christian values.275  “That certain, but 
by no means all, religious groups condemn the behavior at issue gives the 
State no license to impose their judgments on the entire citizenry.”276  
Justice Blackmun further disparaged the Bowers Court’s failure to 
appreciate the difference between “laws that protect public sensibilities and 
those that enforce private morality.”277  Justice Blackmun, in suggesting the 
illegitimacy of these state purposes, thus implicated Establishment Clause 
values. 
Although plausibly secular purposes, such as preventing harm to the 
spouse or the family, are apparent for adultery laws,278 under the 
Establishment Clause it is the objective purpose of the enactment that 
controls.279  Most of the early enactments of adultery laws were Puritan in 
 
 269. See supra note 121; see also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 589–90 (2003) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that Bowers, which Lawrence overturned, rested on the 
impossibility of distinguishing between homosexuality and other “moral” offenses such as 
adultery); State ex rel. Z.C., 2007 UT 54, ¶ 20, 165 P.3d 1206 (Utah 2007) (noting that 
adultery laws “demonstrate the legislature’s disapproval of the acts of both participants for 
violating a moral standard”). 
 270. See Loewy, supra note 121, at 160 (“The rationale for much moral legislation is 
religious . . . .” (citing Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986) (Burger, C.J., 
concurring))). 
 271. Idleman, supra note 163, at 6. 
 272. See Loewy, supra note 121, at 165–66. 
 273. Id. at 161. 
 274. Id. at 166. 
 275. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 211 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 276. Id. 
 277. Id. at 212. 
 278. See supra notes 219–36 and accompanying text. 
 279. See supra notes 164–91 and accompanying text. 
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nature, and thus overtly religious.280  In New York’s case, although updated 
in the 1960s, nothing in the enactment of its current adultery statute reflects 
an objectively secular legislative purpose, such as to prevent harm to the 
spouse.281  Instead, the purpose, advocated by members of the Christian 
establishment, was to avoid the appearance of approval of immoral 
conduct.282 
III.  PROPOSING AND APPLYING THE “ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE PRISM” 
Part II of this Note presented the arguments for and against the 
constitutionality of adultery bans, examined under substantive due process 
doctrine (and its intimate association gloss), as well as Establishment 
Clause doctrine.  Under substantive due process after Lawrence, it is 
possible that no adultery ban can withstand a challenge (if Lawrence is read 
to strike down any ban on private consensual sexual activity among 
adults).283  It is also possible, however, that the plausible state interests in 
preventing harm to others,284 considered with Lawrence’s own disavowal of 
application to situations that can cause injury,285 may allow adultery bans to 
survive “rational basis” review or higher scrutiny.  The Court’s intimate 
association jurisprudence suggests that a subset of adulterous relationships 
(those that resemble a marriage) may be protected on a case-by-case 
basis,286 but that the majority of run-of-the-mill extra-marital affairs will be 
tainted in the Court’s eye by their adulterous nature.287  Finally, under the 
Establishment Clause, adultery bans will probably survive, despite their 
religious origins, given their plausible secular purposes, including the 
prevention of harm to others.288 
Even if adultery bans can survive each of these challenges independently, 
they should nevertheless be found unconstitutional.  Part III presents this 
argument and, in so doing, proposes a novel approach to substantive due 
process analysis.  Specifically, Part III proposes and applies what this note 
dubs an Establishment Clause prism, through which an arguably legitimate 
state interest in infringing a constitutionally important liberty interest is 
refracted and delegitimized by the enactment’s religiosity.  Though far from 
a natural pairing of constitutional doctrines, the Establishment Clause and 
the Due Process Clause (as interpreted in the substantive due process 
setting) do not offend one another’s purpose, as both serve to protect 
individual liberty from encumbrance by state action.289 
 
 280. See supra notes 45–47 and accompanying text. 
 281. See supra Part I.B.2.b. 
 282. See supra Part I.B.2.b.  
 283. See supra notes 243–53 and accompanying text. 
 284. See supra notes 219–36 and accompanying text. 
 285. See supra text accompanying note 120. 
 286. See supra notes 254–58 and accompanying text. 
 287. See supra notes 259–65 and accompanying text. 
 288. See supra Part II.C. 
 289. Cf. Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881–82 
(describing the U.S. Supreme Court’s “hybrid rights” jurisprudence relating to the Free 
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A.  Arriving at the Establishment Clause Prism 
Lawrence ushered in a new era of constitutional law in the realm of 
sexual privacy, as evidenced at least by the amount of commentary it has 
generated.290  Whether one understands Lawrence as establishing a 
fundamental right to sexual privacy (in line with Griswold and Casey)291 or 
as standing for the proposition that the state can never have a legitimate 
interest in proscribing private, victimless, consensual sexual activity,292 
Lawrence at least signals that sexual privacy is a constitutionally important 
liberty interest,293 and that regulations that encroach upon it should be 
carefully considered. 
The Virginia Supreme Court’s interpretation of Lawrence as an apparent 
“hybridization” of the traditional substantive due process analysis is 
instructive.294  In Martin v. Ziherl, the court interpreted Lawrence’s 
statement—that the Texas statute furthered no legitimate state interest that 
can justify the state’s intrusion—to mean that no state interest suffices to 
justify infringement of a constitutionally important liberty interest is at 
stake.295  This approach implies that, under Lawrence, a state interest may 
be delegitimized when measured against a particular type of liberty interest, 
namely sexual privacy.  This is not to say—and indeed Lawrence did not 
explicitly announce—that such a liberty interest warrants characterization 
as a “fundamental right.”296  Nevertheless, the “emerging awareness” 
regarding sexual privacy was sufficient to delegitimize and negate the 
state’s interest.297  Indeed, the fact that the majority opinion in Lawrence 
avoids mentioning the state’s asserted interest suggests that Lawrence’s 
holding applies to any state interest, not just to the actually asserted interest 
of promoting morality.298  The Martin Court went even further, identifying 
plausibly legitimate asserted state interests in maintaining a fornication ban 
(e.g., public health) and dismissing them outright under Lawrence.299 
 
Exercise Clause in combination with other constitutional protections, whereby a neutral, 
generally applicable law that encumbers a religious activity is invalid if that activity relates 
to another constitutional protection, such as directing the education of one’s children), reh’g 
denied, 496 U.S. 913 (1990).  The “hybrid rights” doctrine, particularly in the context of the 
parental right to direct the upbringing of one’s children, has not been uniformly applied. See 
generally Heather M. Good, Comment, “The Forgotten Child of Our Constitution”:  The 
Parental Free Exercise Right To Direct the Education and Religious Upbringing of 
Children, 54 EMORY L.J. 641 (2005); Michael E. Lechliter, Note, The Free Exercise of 
Religion and Public Schools:  The Implications of Hybrid Rights on the Religious 
Upbringing of Children, 103 MICH. L. REV. 2209 (2005). 
 290. As of October 1, 2010, LexisNexis identifies 3832 law review and journal articles 
that cite Lawrence. 
 291. See supra notes 130–34 and accompanying text. 
 292. See supra notes 249–53 and accompanying text. 
 293. See supra note 140 and accompanying text. 
 294. See supra notes 251–53 and accompanying text. 
 295. See supra text accompanying note 251. 
 296. But see supra notes 204–05 and accompanying text. 
 297. See supra notes 115–19 and accompanying text. 
 298. See supra note 121 and accompanying text. 
 299. See supra note 252 and accompanying text. 
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This Note proposes an analogous “hybridization,” but where the state’s 
interest is viewed not with reference to the liberty interest at stake, but 
instead with reference to the Establishment Clause and its values.  This 
Establishment Clause prism serves to refract and delegitimize facially 
legitimate state interests where they implicate the individual liberty that the 
Establishment Clause serves to protect.  Put another way, the proposed 
Establishment Clause prism devalues the purported legitimacy of a state’s 
asserted interest as against the “rational basis” baseline threshold as a result 
of the religiosity of the state action. 
The Establishment Clause serves to protect individual liberty by limiting 
the coercive force of the state in matters pertaining to religion.300  To meet 
this objective, Establishment Clause jurisprudence has developed such that 
courts scrutinize the objective legislative purpose of an enactment to 
determine whether there is a secular purpose—in other words, no 
predominantly religious purpose.  Courts do so not as a formal exercise of 
judicial limitations on state power, but instead as a protection of liberty, 
weeding out governmental enactments that serve, through force of law, to 
impair an individual’s liberty by endorsing religion.301 
In Lawrence, the Establishment Clause was neither mentioned nor 
asserted.  Yet, the Supreme Court impliedly, and the court below expressly, 
analyzed Texas’s legislative purpose; although not explicitly addressing 
purpose under the religious/secular dichotomy, the courts nevertheless 
sought to judge the merit of the “why” of the enactment.302  The Lawrence 
Court, citing Casey, suggested that the sodomy ban was not an appropriate 
use of a criminal code, noting an “‘obligation is to define the liberty of all, 
not to mandate our own moral code.’”303  In so doing, Lawrence impliedly 
invoked the Establishment Clause, rejecting the legitimacy of a legislative 
purpose that is interrelated with religio-moral values (at least when it comes 
to “an emerging awareness” regarding matters of sexual privacy).304  This 
Note proposes making explicit this approach to the state’s interest in a 
substantive due process challenge—that is, refracting the state’s interest 
through an Establishment Clause prism. 
 
 300. See supra notes 151–57 and accompanying text. 
 301. See supra Part I.E. 
 302. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 571 (2003) (“The condemnation [of 
homosexual conduct] has been shaped by religious beliefs, conceptions of right and 
acceptable behavior, and respect for the traditional family.”); Lawrence v. State, 41 S.W.3d 
349, 361 (Tex. Ct. App. 2001) (citing repudiation of homosexual conduct by Western 
religions as supporting the “American tradition of statutory proscription”), rev’d, Lawrence, 
539 U.S. 558 (2003); see also Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 582 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the 
judgment) (noting Texas’s assertion of “the promotion of morality” as a “legitimate state 
interest”). 
 303. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 
U.S. 833, 850 (1992)). 
 304. Some view this as a delegitimization based on morality-based justifications alone. 
See supra note 137 and accompanying text.  This Note, however, proposes that it is the 
religiosity of morality simpliciter that is the basis for such a delegitimization. 
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The Establishment Clause prism provides that, in a substantive due 
process challenge to state action, even where a fundamental right is not at 
stake, if the enactment is substantially motivated by religious values, the 
state’s asserted interest is delegitimized.  Whether this is viewed as a form 
of rational basis with Establishment Clause bite, or some form of 
intermediate scrutiny, the result is the same.  Where a recognized liberty 
interest is at stake, though not necessarily a fundamental right, a state’s 
interest is less legitimate than it would otherwise be if it is infected with a 
purpose that implicates the Establishment Clause and its values.  
B.  Applying the Establishment Clause Prism to Adultery Bans 
Applying the Establishment Clause prism, adultery bans should be found 
unconstitutional.  Adultery, as consensual sex with the spouse of another, is 
conduct relating to the “personal and private life of the individual” “in 
matters pertaining to sex” recognized by Lawrence.305  As such an 
important liberty interest, whether or not “fundamental,” adultery at least 
merits closer investigation. 
Closer investigation using the traditional substantive due process 
approach reveals numerous facially legitimate state interests beyond 
morality simpliciter (unlike the asserted state interest in Lawrence306), 
including protection of harm to the spouse and children, and prevention of 
the spread of disease.307  Although an adultery proscription is not narrowly 
drawn to meet these ends,308 and thus would likely not satisfy the Court’s 
“strict scrutiny” standard where a “fundamental right” is at stake, an 
adultery ban at least bears some rational relationship to these goals.309  For 
example, deterring adultery by criminal proscriptions would likely correlate 
with reduction of harm to spouses and the spread of disease.310 
Closer investigation of the state’s actual purpose in proscribing adultery, 
à la the Establishment Clause, reveals substantial religious underpinnings, 
implicating the Establishment Clause’s mandate of maintaining religious 
and irreligious liberty free from the coercive power of the state.311  First, 
the crime of adultery requires, as a necessary condition of liability, 
marriage.312  Marriage, although increasingly secularized in American law, 
is a distinctly religious institution with deep, arguably inseparable, religious 
 
 305. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 572, 578; supra notes 115, 119 and accompanying text. 
 306. See supra note 121. 
 307. See supra notes 219–27 and accompanying text. 
 308. See supra notes 237–42 and accompanying text. 
 309. But see supra notes 243–48 and accompanying text. 
 310. The relative strength of this correlation or the lack of deterrence—particularly given 
the lax enforcement of these laws—would undermine the rational relationship. See supra 
notes 243–48 and accompanying text.  Nevertheless, the “rational basis” standard sets a very 
low bar. 
 311. See supra notes 151–57 and accompanying text. 
 312. See supra Part I.B. 
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roots.313  Thus, any attempts to protect the integrity of “holy matrimony” 
are attempts to protect a wholly, or at least predominantly, religious 
institution.314 
Furthermore, adultery proscriptions, particularly in this country, have 
unmistakably religious, especially Puritanical, origins.315  Despite plausible 
secular purposes that may have developed since colonial times, the actual 
legislative purpose of these enactments was religious.316  New York’s 
adultery statute is a representative example.317  The New York ban was 
independently considered and re-enacted in 1965 along with the Penal Law 
overhaul.318  The proposed elimination of the adultery statute caused an 
uproar in the community, particularly from the Christian establishment.319  
To allay the fears of state-sponsored moral decrepitude, Assemblyman 
Volker re-introduced New York’s current adultery statute.320  Upon its 
approval in both houses of the New York legislature, Volker sent the bill up 
to the Governor, with a cover letter specifically citing the religious uproar, 
and implying a legislative purpose to “observ[e] the conventions.”321  Such 
strongly suggestive religio-moral language was singular and alone, 
unaccompanied by any facially secular language, such as citation to the 
alleged harms of adultery.322  The objective purpose of New York’s 
adultery ban is thus left with the indelible religious watermark of avoiding 
“tacit approval for immoral conduct.”323 
Refracting New York’s enactment through the Establishment Clause 
prism, its religious undertones, lacking an explicit or implicit secular 
purpose, should delegitimize any state interest (such as harm to third-
 
 313. See supra Part I.A; see also Laycock, supra note 27, at 202 (calling marriage “our 
most fundamental and long lasting breach of separation of church and state”). 
 314. To the extent that such attempts (e.g., adultery bans) are an endorsement of 
“traditional” religious marriage, causing those involved in polyamorous relationships, or 
same-sex relationships, to feel like disfavored outsiders, they may directly implicate the 
Establishment Clause. See supra text accompanying notes 161–62.  This line of thought, 
however, may be a slippery slope towards the legal recognition of polygamy, bans of which 
have long been held to be constitutional. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164–66 
(1878). 
 315. See supra notes 42–48 and accompanying text. 
 316. But cf. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 449 (1961) (upholding Sunday closing 
laws because of an evolved secular purpose despite uncontested religious origins).  The 
Court has squared McGowan with its other Establishment Clause cases by noting that the 
Sunday closing laws “advance[] religion only minimally because many working people 
would take the day as one of rest regardless.” McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 861 
(2005). 
 317. See supra Part I.B.2.b. 
 318. See supra Part I.B.2.b. 
 319. See supra note 71 and accompanying text. 
 320. See supra note 71 and accompanying text. 
 321. See Letter from Julius Volker, supra note 74; see also supra notes 72–74 and 
accompanying text. 
 322. See supra notes 72–74 and accompanying text. 
 323. See Letter from Julius Volker, supra note 74; see also supra text accompanying note 
74.  The Governor approved the bill without addressing its merits. See supra text 
accompanying note 75. 
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parties) asserted as a defense to a substantive due process challenge.  The 
Establishment Clause prism is appropriate because the religious undertones 
of the law implicate the Establishment Clause’s values of protecting 
individual liberty from the coercive force of the state.  Thus, despite 
articulable harms of adultery that may be rationally related to a ban, the 
state interest, delegitimized when refracted through the Establishment 
clause prism, cannot “justify [the state’s] intrusion into the personal and 
private life of the individual.”324 
C.  The Establishment Clause Prism in Other Contexts 
The proposed Establishment Clause prism does not require a radical 
departure from the Supreme Court’s substantive due process jurisprudence.  
Indeed, application of the Establishment Clause prism to Lawrence v. 
Texas,325 Washington v. Glucksberg,326 and Roe v. Wade327 does not alter 
their outcome. 
In Lawrence, the sodomy bans were motivated purely by the asserted 
state interest of promoting morality, an interest wrought with religious 
underpinnings.328  Thus, even if there is no fundamental right to 
homosexual sodomy or sexual privacy in general, the sodomy ban should 
not survive “rational basis” review because the state’s interest, refracted 
through the Establishment Clause prism, is delegitimized due to its 
religiosity. 
Applying the Establishment Clause prism to the substantive due process 
calculus likewise fails to alter the Court’s decision in Washington v. 
Glucksberg, a case upholding bans on assisted suicide.  Framed by the 
Court as a “right to die” case involving terminally ill patients, Glucksberg 
affirmed that there was no fundamental right to die, and thus analyzed the 
state’s interest in criminalizing assisted suicide using the “rational basis” 
standard.329  The state’s asserted interests in Glucksberg were the 
preservation of human life, the protection of the integrity and ethics of the 
medical profession, the protection of vulnerable groups such as the poor 
and the elderly from abuse or coercion, and the prevention of involuntary 
euthanasia.330  The actual purposes of the statute at issue in Glucksberg, as 
 
 324. Cf. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003). 
 325. See supra Part I.C.2. 
 326. 521 U.S. 702 (1997). 
 327. See supra notes 95–98 and accompanying text. 
 328. See supra note 121.  The Texas Legislators argued in their amici brief in Lawrence 
that their interests in the sodomy ban were the protection of public health and the promotion 
of marriage and procreation. See Brief for Texas Legislators et al. as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Respondent at 15–25, Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558 (No. 02-102), 2003 WL 470181.  
The legislators cited no legislative history supporting that the asserted state interest was the 
actual legislative purpose of the enactment, however, despite touting the existence of 
“[h]ours and hours of tapes of hearings and testimony” during the 1973 legislative session 
“establish[ing] the legislative record.” See id. at 13 n.5. 
 329. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 728. 
 330. See id. at 728, 731–32, 734 (citing Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 
261, 281–82 (1990)). 
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evidenced by the legislative history, are consistent with the state interests 
asserted during the litigation.331  Though many or all of these interests 
might happen to align with religious beliefs or tenets,332 there is no 
evidence of any religious undertone or moral justification for the enactment 
of this ban on assisted suicide.  Thus, the Establishment Clause prism here 
fails to “bend” the substantive due process analysis. 
Likewise, in Roe v. Wade,333 the Establishment Clause prism would not 
alter the substantive due process calculus.  In Roe, the Court found a 
compelling state interest in banning abortion, at least at a certain point 
during the pregnancy.334  Consistent with the asserted state interest, the 
legislative history of the abortion statute in Roe suggests nothing other than 
a desire to protect the health of the mother.335  Indeed, a religious 
justification for an abortion ban was non-existent at the time of the original 
enactment in 1854.336  The Establishment Clause prism would therefore 
leave the substantive due process analysis unaltered in Roe. 
In sum, applying the Establishment Clause prism to the facts of some of 
the Court’s important substantive due process decisions leads to consistent 
results, whether the Court upheld a fundamental right as in Roe, refused to 
find a fundamental right  as in Glucksberg, or left the question somewhat 
open as in Lawrence.  
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court’s landmark sexual privacy decision Lawrence v. 
Texas has called into question all state encroachments into the realm of 
sexual autonomy.  The opaque opinion has begot not only significant debate 
over what, if any, fundamental rights exist regarding sexual privacy, but 
also questions such as whether and to what extent a state’s interest in 
abridging (or banning outright) certain sexual conduct is legitimate.  All 
such regulations—addressing topics from sodomy to sexual devices, from 
bestiality to polygamy—are called into question. 
Criminal adultery bans occupy a unique middle ground in Justice Scalia’s 
parade of horribles.337  On the one hand, there is a straightforward analogy 
 
 331. See Brief for the Petitioners at 5, Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (No. 96-110), 1996 WL 
656349 (“‘[T]he introduction into the situation of another person who actively promotes the 
suicide could well increase the instability or irrationality of the potential suicide, affecting 
his judgment or emotional outlook.’” (quoting LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL’S JUDICIARY COMM., 
REPORT ON THE REVISED WASHINGTON CRIMINAL CODE 153 (1970))). 
 332. Cf. supra note 176. 
 333. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 334. See supra notes 95–98 and accompanying text. 
 335. See Brief for Appellants at 35–36, Roe, 410 U.S. 113 (No. 70-18), 1971 WL 128054. 
 336. See id. at 38 (noting that “the [Church’s] first enduring break from the theory that an 
embryo had life at 40 days if male and 80 days if female” occurred in 1869, and that “[i]n 
1854 induced abortion was not an excommunicable offense when undertaken in the early 
stages”). 
 337. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 590 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“State laws 
against bigamy, same-sex marriage, adult incest, prostitution, masturbation, adultery, 
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to sodomy bans—a proscription of a certain type of sexual activity, 
predicated on the preservation of good morals.  On the other hand, upon 
closer investigation, adultery bans are distinguishable—they directly 
implicate the nature of the institution of marriage and arguably prevent 
harm to third parties.  Thus, in the world of substantive due process, 
adultery bans present an interesting conundrum. 
Adultery bans, however, invite another avenue of constitutional analysis, 
under the Establishment Clause.  Specifically, adultery is a non-violent 
crime, perpetrated by consenting adults, who participate in an act that is 
arguably protected by the Constitution but for the fact that they are not 
married to each other, but rather one or both are married to another.  Since 
marriage itself has religious roots, and adultery bans originate from and are 
motivated by religious forces, adultery bans beg for scrutiny under the 
Establishment Clause.  Nevertheless, the state’s purpose in criminalizing 
adultery arguably extends beyond morality simpliciter to plausible secular 
justifications, and thus the Establishment Clause’s protections may not be 
directly applicable. 
This Note proffers that the Establishment Clause’s values should not be 
ignored in a substantive due process analysis.  Instead, the Establishment 
Clause should be applied as a prism, through which a state’s purportedly 
legitimate interests are refracted.  If the enactments are free of religiosity, 
the prism will leave the state’s interests unbent.  If, on the other hand, they 
are infected with religious motivation, the Establishment Clause prism will 
refract and delegitimize the state’s interest.  Specifically, although a state is 
absolutely barred from passing laws with no secular purpose that endorse a 
religion, a state’s interest in passing a law with little secular purpose that is 
motivated substantially by religion and that infringes upon a 
constitutionally important liberty interest should at least be called into 
question.  The Establishment Clause prism takes into account the protection 
of individual liberty from intrusion by the state afforded both by the Due 
Process Clause and the Establishment Clause.  Under this approach, 
adultery bans should not withstand constitutional scrutiny against a 
substantive due process challenge because any plausibly legitimate state 
interests are delegitimized when refracted through the prism of the 
Establishment Clause. 
 
 
fornication, bestiality, and obscenity are likewise sustainable only in light of Bowers’ 
validation of laws based on moral choices.”). 
